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MYTHS OF VOLUNTARY COMPLIANCE: LESSONS FROM THE
STARLINK CORN FIASCO
REBECCA M. BRATSPIES'
What do our consumers have to say when the FDA is not there and the EPA
is not there, Agriculture's not there, but Friends of the Earth find this out?
What kind of regulatory scheme is that?'
On September 18, 2000, a coalition of consumer and environmental
groups detected DNA fragments from StarLink corn in Taco Bell taco shells
sold in grocery stores.2 StarLink corn, a genetically modified ("GM") variety
of corn patented by Aventis CropScience, had only been approved for use as
animal feed, and not for human consumption.4 Days later, Kraft Foods
recalled all Taco Bell taco shells.5 Kraft's action started a frenzy of recalls as
* Rebecca Bratspies is an Associate Professor at the University of Idaho College of Law. She
would like to thank Judith Wise, Holly Doremus, Dale Goble, B. Allen Schulz, and the
participants of the Central States Law School Association 2002 meeting for helpful feedback
on earlier versions of this paper.
'The Future of Food: Biotechnology and Consumer Confidence Before the Senate Comm.
on Health, Education, Labor and Pensions, 107th Cong. (Sept. 26, 2000) (statement of Sen.
Tom Harkin (D-Ia.)) (quoted in GM Food on Senate Menu, at http://www.cbsnews.com/
stories/2000/09/26/national/main236438.html (last visited Mar. 23, 2003)).
2 Marc Kaufman, Biotech Critics Cite Unapproved Corn in Taco Shells; Gene-Modified
Variety Allowed only for Animal Feed Because ofAllergy Concerns, WASH. POST, Sept. 18,
2000, at A2 [hereinafter Unapproved Corn]. A coalition of environmental groups purchased
twenty-three corn-containing grocery products and sent the products for genetic testing.
StarLink Corn: How it Reached the Food Supply, A.P., Dec. 4, 2002, available at
http://archive.showmenews.com2000/dec/20001204busiOll.asp. On September 18, the
groups convened a press conference and announced that the tests had found traces of
StarLink corn. Id.
' The patents for StarLink corn were first held by Plant Genomic Science, which was later
acquired by AgrEvo and ultimately became Aventis Crop Science. As part of the fallout from
the StarLink crisis, Aventis CropScience was later sold to Bayer AG. For convenience, all
the relevant corporate entities will be referred to as Aventis. Information available at
http://www.bayercropscience.con/bayer/cropscience/cscms.nsf/id/BioScience.
4 Id.
5 Press Release, Kraft Foods, Kraft Food Announces Voluntary Recall of All Taco Bell Taco
Shell Products from Grocery Stores (Sept. 22, 2000), available at http://www.kraft.comlnews
room/ 092200.html.
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other manufacturers discovered StarLink corn in their products.6 By
November of 2000, the FDA exercised its enforcement authority to recall
nearly three hundred types of adulterated snack chips, corn flour, and other
corn foods.7 The cost of these recalls ran into the hundreds of millions of
dollars Complaints began pouring into the Food and Drug Administration
("FDA") and the Center for Disease Control ("CDC") about allergic reactions
to corn products attributable to StarLink contamination. 9 Overnight, StarLink
became a "Frankenfood" posterchild-the incarnation of GM critics' worst
nightmares.'0 International corn exports plummeted." The ensuing crisis
paralyzed an entire sector of American agriculture and food production,12 and
badly shook consumer confidence. 3 Even two years later, StarLink corn is
6 See, e.g., Biotech Corn Recall Expands in Stores, Restaurants, WASH. POST, Nov. 3,2000,
at A5; 50% of Corn May be Impure; Problem Could Cost Hundreds of Millions, DES
MOINES REG., Oct. 28, 2000, at IA; Mark Kaufman, Corn Woes Prompt Kellogg Plant
Shutdown, WASH. POST, Oct. 21, 2000 at A2; Starlink Costs ADM 'Tens of Thousands,'
REUTERS, Oct. 26,2000, summary athttp://www.pestlaw.com/x/news/2000/20001022.html;
Western Family Recalls Products with Altered Corn, THE OREGONIAN, Oct. 26,2000, at A2,
available at 2000 WL 27103380.
" FDA Enforcement Report for November 1, 2000, available at http:llwww.fda.gov/bbs/
topics/ENFORCE/ENF00666.html.
' Sarah Lueck et al., Corn-Recall Cost Could Reach Hundreds of Millions Even as Some
Firms Benefit, WALL ST. J., Nov. 3, 2000, at A2. See also Mike Glover, Biotech Corn Deal
Reached, SAN ANTONIO ExPRESS-NEws, Jan. 24, 2001, at 3E, available at 2001 WL
5228144 (reporting that Aventis agreed to settle the class action lawsuit for an undisclosed
amount estimated to be $100 million to $1 billion). See also Sutter v. Aventis Cropscience
USA Holding, Inc., 145 F.Supp. 2d 1050, 1053-54 (S.D. Ia. 2001); Dupraz v. Aventis
Cropscience USA Holding, Inc., 153 F. Supp. 2d 1102, 1103 (D.S.D. 2001).
9 See Report, ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH DIVISION, CENTER FOR DISEASE CONTROL,
INVESTIGATION OF HUMAN HEALTH EFFECrS ASSOCIATED WITH POTENTIAL EXPOSURE TO
GENETICALLY MODIFIED CORN (2001) [hereinafter CDC REPORT], available at
http:lwww.cdc.gov/ncehlehhelCry9cReport (reporting technical assistance in assessing
allergies related to Starlink corn was performed by CDC at the request of FDA).
10 See Troy Goodman, Are Biotech Crops Sowing Seeds of Dispute? (Jan. 24, 2001), at
http:llwww.cnn.com2001/FOOD/newsl0l1/24biotech.hunger/?related.
" See William Lin et al., StarLink: Impacts on the U.S. Corn Market and World Trade,
USDA FEED, SrrUATION AND OUTLOOK46, 52 (Apr. 2001), available at http://usda.mannlib.
cornell.edulreports/erssor/fieldlfds-bby/fds2OOl .pdf.
'
2 See id. at 46.
See Aventis SA Sued for a Second Time Over Starlink Corn Scare, FOOD & DRINK WKLY.,
Jan. 9, 2001, at 1.
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still popping up in corn shipments and still has the power to roil international
markets.' 4
One company, with one GM crop, managed to contaminate food for
millions of households and brought an. international commodities market to
a standstill. Now that the dust has settled, it is time to consider why things
went so disastrously awry. How did this happen? How do we prevent it from
happening again? All eyes are on the United States; If these crops cannot be
regulated effectively here, can we really envision their successful use in
countries with less developed regulatory programs? StarLink corn exposed
a gaping hole in the GM crop regulatory framework. More recently,
ProdiGene' 5 fell through that same regulatory hole--providing further
evidence of a regulatory system in crisis. Unless action is taken, StarLink will
be only the harbinger of more troubles to come.
The United States' policies toward adoption of GM technology are
more favorable than any other industrialized countries', 6 and the United
"4 Gene-Altered Corn Hits Prices, GLOBE & MAIL, Dec. 31, 2002, at B18; Tom Sellen,
Commodities Report: Corn Falls to Three Week Low on Shipment's Genetic Tainting, WALL
ST. J., Dec. 31, 2002, at Cll, available at 2002 WL WSJ 103129959 (reporting on the
effects of Japanese discovery of StarLink Contamination in a December 2002 corn
shipment); US Defends Safety of Its GM Foods, ASIA PULSE, Jan. 7, 2003, available at 2003
WL 4231643 (reporting that in response to the Japanese announcement, India rejected a corn
aid shipment on biosafety grounds).
5 ProdiGene is an ag-biotech company developing "biopharm" crops-agricultural crops that
have been genetically modified to produce industrial or pharmaceutical products. For a
discussion of ProdiGene's regulatory near-disaster, see infra Part III.
6 In 2001, the United States accounted for sixty-eight percent of the total acreage of biotech
crops planted. Argentina and Canada both enthusiastic adopters of GM technology,
accounted for twenty-two percent and six percent respectively. James Stamps, Trade in
Biotechnology Food Products, INT'L. ECON. REV., Nov./Dec. 2002, at 5. The European
Union ("EU"), by contrast, has maintained a de facto moratorium on any new regulatory
approvals for GM crops or foods. See Council Directive 90/220/EEC, 1990 O.J. (L 117)15-
27 (repealed Oct. 10, 2002 by Council Directive 2001/18/EEC, 2001 O.J. (L 106) 1-39).
Recently the EU replaced this de facto moratorium with new, extremely stringent GM
regulatory law: Directive 2001/18/EEC. In the developing world, response to this new
technology has varied widely. China has adopted and promoted an indigenous GM industry,
while many African states (including most'recently Zimbabwe and Zambia) have sharply
rejected the technology as a new form of colonialism. India and much of the rest of the world
display a deep ambivalence. See generally DAVID G. VICTOR & C. FORD RUNGE, SUSTAINING
A REVOLUTION: A POLICY FOR CROP ENGINEERING 2,6 (2002).
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States accounts for most of the world's GM harvest. 17 Around the world, GM
promoters offer the United States' regulatory system as a proxy for the safety
of these crops in general, and as an example of how GM crops can be safely
deployed. 8 StarLink corn blasted the assertion that United States regulation
equals safety, and it provides a cautionary tale about what happens when a
regulatory scheme has no credible enforcement strategy. StarLink also
undermines a cornerstone assumption of the United States' regulatory
strategy: that voluntary self-policing can be a viable, long-term strategy for
managing this revolution in agriculture.
This Article explores the StarLink crisis in some detail. After
discussing a general overview of the regulatory framework implicated by the
StarLink fiasco in Part I, Part II provides a detailed analysis of the regulatory
approval process that vetted StarLink corn. Part HI uses StarLink corn to
explore the structural flaws in this process-flaws that made the StarLink
fiasco inevitable from the beginning. Part IV uses the StarLink fiasco to draw
lessons about how market forces can support or undercut regulatory regimes,
and suggests that the deficiencies highlighted by the StarLink fiasco are part
of a broader ideological struggle over the proper role of government in the
marketplace. Finally, Part V proposes a new regulatory approach for GM
crops, grounded in both science and in the realities of a market economy.
Regulatory missteps can doom this promising new technology. Without
public confidence in the regulatory system, successful adoption of ag-
biotechnology is unlikely. Thus, the new approach proposed is aimed at
17 See Jorge Fernandez-Comejo & William D. McBride, Agricultural Biotechnology:
Adoption ofBiotechnology and its Production Impacts, ERS Agricultural Economic Report
No. AER810 (May 2002), available at http://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/aer8l0 (last
updated May 21, 2002).
"s See, e.g., Evaluation of the U.S. Regulatory Process for Crops Developed Through
Biotechnology, 19 COUNCIL FOR AGRIC. ScI. & TECH. 1, 4-8 (Oct. 2001); Ben Lilliston,
Don't Ask, Don't Know: The Biotech Regulatory Vacuum, MULTINAT'L MONITOR, Jan. 1,
2000, at 9, available at 2000 WL 16039144 (quoting Senator Kit Bond, R-Mo.); Monsanto
Company, Roundup Ready Corn-Alleged Detection By FOE Q & A Monsanto Company
(Nov. 7, 2000), available at http://www.monsanto.com/monsanto/layout/media/00/1 1-07-
00a.asp (offering United States regulatory approval as evidence that corn unapproved by the
EU was safe for human consumption.); Thomas P. Redick et al., Private Legal Mechanisms
for Regulating the Risks of Genetically Modified Organisms: An Alternative Path Within the
Biosafety Protocol, 4 ENVTL. L. 1, 17, 27 (1997).
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providing the regulatory oversight needed to ensure public health and safety,
while still permitting an exploration of biotechnology's promise.
I. BACKGROUND
A. What is StarLink Corn-A Brief Introduction
Farmers began genetically manipulating plants long before they knew
about genes. For thousands of years, farmers have selectively bred plants to
enhance desirable traits and to suppress undesirable ones. Selective breeding
exploits natural variations within a species to develop new, more desirable
strains. 9 Over time, this process of selective breeding can produce a radically
altered species. Unlike modem genetic engineering, however, selective
breeding can enhance or suppress only those traits already present in a
population.
Modem genetic engineering (including such techniques as gene
deletion, gene doubling, introducing a foreign gene, and changing the
positions of genes) has freed the process of genetic modification from
limitations imposed by the existing characteristics of a species. Functional
genes can now be isolated and transferred to a food crop from any
organism-across species, class, phylum and kingdom. In other words,
genetic engineering enables breeders to recombine genes themselves. Genetic
engineers thereby avoid the main constraint on selective breeding-the need
to start with sexually compatible organisms. This technology can create
organisms that do not, and could not, exist without such intervention. The
new technology also radically alters the timescale of genetic modification.
Developing a new strain through selective breeding can take years or
decades.2 ° With the tools of genetic engineering, new strains may be
developed much more rapidly.
Commercial applications of this technology thus far have
concentrated on bioengineering pest resistance and herbicide tolerance into
widely planted crops like com, soy, cotton and potatoes l.2 Growers adopting
"9 For a general explanation of these points, accessible to the non-scientist, see Feeding the
Five Billion, ECONOMIST, Nov. 10, 2001, available at 2001 WL 7320818.
20 See NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, GENETICALLY MODIFIED PEST-PROTECTED PLANTS:
SCIENCE AND REGULATION, app. A (2000).
2 See VICTOR & RUNGE, supra note 16, at 16-17.
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these "first generation" GM crops have been able to increase yields while
significantly reducing costly inputs like chemical pesticides and fertilizers.22
StarLink corn was a typical first generation GM crop-a corn hybrid
modified to make it more profitable to grow, rather than to change its
nutritional content.23 StarLink corn contained two added genes-one
conveying herbicide tolerance and one conveying insect resistance. 24 The
herbicide tolerance gene was the product of an earlier approval process. 25 It
was the addition of a gene derived from the bacterial species Bacillus
thuringiensis (Bt),26 coding for an insecticidal protein called Cry9C, that
triggered the StarLink crisis.
Certain varieties of the Bt bacteria naturally produce a number of
pesticidal proteins that are toxic to some significant lepidopteran agricultural
pests.27 The Bt organism and its array of insecticidal proteins have been well-
studied.28 As a result, there is a substantial body of scientific information
available on the use of Bt as a spray-on pesticide, particularly in the organic
farming industry.29 In crops that have been genetically modified to express Bt
proteins, one of the Bt genes conveying pest resistance is introduced into the
plant's DNA. This gene enables the plant itself to produce the Bt protein,
thereby protecting the plant from insect damage. The gene most commonly
22 Id.
23 For an overview of research findings related to the economic impacts of transgenic crops,
see Michelle C. Marra et al., The Payoffs to Transgenic Field Crops: An Assessment of the
Evidence, 5 AGBIo FORUM 43 (2003), available at http://www.agbioforum.org.
24 USDA/APHIS Petition 97-265-01p for Determination of Non-Regulated Status for Bt
Cry9C Insect Resistant and Glufosinate Tolerant Corn Transformation Event CBH-351, May
1998, at 6-9 [hereinafter StarLink Non-Regulated Determination], available at
http://www.aphis.usda.gov/biotech/dec-docs/9726501p-ea.HTM.
25 AgrEvo USA Co.; Availability of Determination of Nonregulated Status for Corn
Genetically Engineered for Insect Resistance and Glufosinate Herbicide Tolerance, 63 Fed.
Reg. 27,041 (May 15, 1998).
26 Id. at 27,042.
27 Lepidoptera is a large order of insects, comprised of butterflies and moths. For a
description of the biological mechanism by which Bt kills Lepidopteran pests, see INT'L LIFE
Sc. INST., AN EVALUATION OF INSECT RESISTANCE MANAGEMENT IN BT FIELD CORN: A
SCIENCE BASED FRAMEWORK FOR RISK ASSESSMENT AND RISK MANAGEMENT 9-10(1998)
[hereinafter ILSI Report].
28 Id. at 1.
29Id. at 13.
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used has been crylA, ° which is approved for use in human and animal food.3'
StarLink corn was produced by inserting a different Bt gene, known as cry9C,
into corn hybrids. The pesticidal protein produced by cry9C controls many
of the same corn pests as those produced by crylA, and kills those pests in the
same way by destroying the insect's stomach cells.32 Unlike crylA, however,
cry9C codes for a protein that shares several unusual molecular properties
with known food allergens.33
B. General Overview of the United States Regulatory System For GM
Crops
In theory, no genetically engineered organism is approved for
commercial use until its proponent has demonstrated that the GM organism
conforms with the standards set by federal law. These standards are intended
to protect human health and the environment, while encouraging the
development of new, potentially lucrative technologies. The United States'
regulatory approach to controlling the new biotechnology of genetic
engineering was developed during the Reagan administration under the aegis
of the Office of Science and Technology Policy ("OSTP"). OSTP drafted a
Coordinated Framework for the Regulation of Biotechnology (the
"Framework"), with the identified goals of creating a "coordinated and
sensible regulatory review process that will minimize the uncertainties and
inefficiencies that can stifle innovation and impair the competitiveness of
U.S. industry,"34 and of "reducing barriers to trade in biotechnology."3 With
these goals in mind, OSTP began its analysis from the political stance that
30 For clarity, this Article adopts scientific nomenclature. References to genes will be
italicized in lower case (ex. cry9C) and references to proteins will be capitalized in normal
typeface (ex. CRY9C).
"' Bacillus thuringiensis CryIA(b) Delta-Endotoxin and the Genetic Material Necessary for
its Production (plasmid vector pCIB4431) in Corn; Exemption from the Requirement of a
Tolerance, 40 C.F.R. § 180.1152 (2002); Bacillus thuringiensis subspecies Kurstaki CryIA©
and the Genetic Material Necessary for its Production in All Plants; Exemption from the
Requirement of a Tolerance, 40 C.F.R. § 180.1155 (2002).
32 ILSI Report, supra note 27, at 9-10.
33 CDC Report, supra note 9, at 4.
" Proposal for a Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology, 49 Fed. Reg.
50,856 (proposed Dec. 31, 1984).
35 id.
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additional regulation was largely unnecessary and from the premise that
existing law could adequately address regulatory questions created by the new
technologies.36
Under the Framework, GM products are fit into an already-existing
set of laws and regulations. As a result, no single agency considers the full
range of problems posed by GM crops. Rather, each agency evaluates only
its own narrow piece of the GM universe. No one is responsible for the
unique problems posed by GM crops, or for overarching questions about safe
use of this new technology. In fact, the StarLink corn fiasco revealed that
these problems can fall entirely outside the purview of agencies applying pre-
existing laws. Compounding this problem is the fact that the relevant
agencies, EPA, FDA and USDA, share no unifying vision of how to answer
the questions and challenges posed by GM crops. For these reasons, the
Framework has been roundly criticized as inadequate.37
Unfortunately, the Reagan and first Bush administrations focused
almost exclusively on deregulation and gave no careful consideration to the
rising chorus of voices (both scientific and public) suggesting that this
approach was not working. Rather than engage in any serious reconsideration
of the basic assumption that existing law could meet the challenges posed by
biotechnology, Vice President Quayle announced reforms designed to "speed
up and simplify" the GM regulatory process. 38 For most of the Clinton
36 Id. at 50,858. As the OSTP concluded that "at the present time existing statutes seem
adequate to deal with the emerging processes and products of modem biotechnology," it thus
recommended that no new legislation need be drafted to regulate biotechnology. See also
Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology, 51 Fed. Reg. 23,302, 23,306 (June
26, 1986).
" Doug Gurian-Sherman, Plugging Holes in the Biotech Safety Net, Center for Science in
the Public Interest, at 1, at http://www.cspinet.org/reports/ (Jan. 7, 2003); Thomas 0.
McGarity et al., Breeding Distrust: An Assessment and Recommendationsfor lmproving the
Regulation of Plant Derived Genetically Modified Foods, at 2, available at
http://www.consumerfed.rog/gmsummary.pdf (2001). For a scholarly critique, see Rebecca
Bratspies, The Illusion of Care: Regulation Uncertainty and Genetically Modified Food
Crops, 10 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L. J. 297 (2002); Thomas 0. McGarity, Seeds of Distrust: Federal
Regulation of Genetically Modified Foods, 35 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 403 (2002). See also,
Gregory A. Jaffe, Inadequacies in the Federal Regulation of Biotechnology, 11 HARV.
ENVTL. L. REV. 491, 528-43 (1987); Note, Designer Genes That Don't Fit: A Tort Regime
for Commercial Releases of Genetic Engineering Products, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1086, 1087-
92 (1987).
38 Kurt Eichenwald, Biotechnology Food: From the Lab to a Debacle, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25,
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administration, this laissez-faire Framework was left intact. Changes
proposed toward the end of the Clinton administration, some in response to
the StarLink crisis, were immediately repudiated by the incoming Bush
Administration, for whom voluntary compliance is something of a mantra.39
Thus, the Reagan Administration policy, which strictly limited regulatory
oversight of GM foods headed for the market, survives to this day. That
regulatory scheme is outlined below.
1. USDA's Regulatory Authority
In theory, USDA's regulatory authority extends to the import,
interstate movement, and environmental release of any organism that poses
a potential threat to United States agriculture.4" To that end, USDA regulates
the interstate movement of genetically engineered crops under the Federal
Plant Protection Act ("FPPA"). 4' The FPPA gives USDA authority to
regulate the movement of organisms that may endanger plant life, and to
prevent the introduction, dissemination or establishment of such organisms.42
This Act could have given USDA wide authority to regulate GM plants.
However, under the Framework, USDA interprets its regulatory duty with
2001, at Al (quoting a May 26, 1992 speech).
" In regulatory areas as diverse as OSHA ergonomic standards, cybersecurity, and the
reduction of greenhouse gases, the Bush administration has consistently rejected concrete
regulatory standards in favor of voluntary compliance programs. See, e.g., Statement of John
L. Henshaw, Assistant Secretary of Labor for Occupational Health and Safety before the
Subcommittee on Workforce Protections Committee on Education and the Workforce,
United States House of Representatives (explaining the administration's reliance on voluntary
compliance after rejecting the ergonomic standards established during Clinton
Administration); Telecommunication Reports, Bush Cybersecurity Proposal Stresses
Voluntary Compliance, Sept. 30, 2002, available at 2002 WL 20134690.40 See e.g., Agricultural Biotechnology: Permitting, Notification and Deregulation, available
at http://www.aphis.usda.gov/ppq/biotech (last visited April 15, 2003).
4 1 7 U.S.C. § 7712 (2000). The FPPA succeeds two earlier statutes: the Federal Plant Pest
Act, U.S.C. §§ 150aa-jj (1957) (repealed 2000), and the Plant Quarantine Act, 7 U.S.C. §§
151-154(a) (1912) (repealed 2000). Within USDA, APHIS has primary regulatory
responsibility over GM crops. See Restrictions on the Introduction of Regulated Articles, 7
C.F.R. § 340.0(a) (2003); Definitions, 7 C.F.R. § 340.1 (2003) (restricting the introduction
of genetically altered organisms without authorization of APHIS). For the sake of clarity, I
will refer to the USDA and APHIS collectively as USDA.
42 7 U.S.C. § 7712(a).
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regard to GM crops extremely narrowly. USDA limits its regulatory oversight
to considering whether a GM crop will itself pose a conventional plant pest
risk when introduced into the environment and/or interstate commerce.43
To conduct this analysis, USDA uses the pre-existing definition of a
plant pest as any living organism that directly or indirectly injures, or causes
disease or damage, to a plant." If USDA is satisfied that a GM plant does not
pose a conventional plant pest risk, the agency views its regulatory inquiry as
ended and will grant "nonregulated" status.45 Once a crop obtains
nonregulated status, USDA places no restrictions or reporting requirements
on the distribution of the crop in the United States.4 As of February 2003,
USDA had granted more than fifty such petitions to GM crops.47
In determining nonregulated status, USDA treats GM crops exactly
like their conventional counterparts and evaluates them for exactly the same
risks. While this plant pest inquiry might be sufficient for conventional crops,
it is far too narrow to properly evaluate the risks posed by GM crops. Most
GM crops currently on the market have been modified to produce pesticides
or to be resistant to herbicides.48 In addition to conventional plant pest risks,
these GM crops may also pose risks based on the unique genes added through
the process of genetic engineering.49 Overuse or misuse of these crops might
generate insect resistance, or might spread herbicide resistance to wild
relatives.5° Such an outcome would not only render the herbicide or pesticide
41 See 7 C.F.R. § 340.0.
44 7 C.F.R. § 340.1.
45 Starlink NonRegulated Determination, supra note 24, at 2-4.
46 United States Regulatory Oversight in Biotechnology, available at http://www.aphis.usda.
gov/biotech/OECD/usregs.htm (last visited Apr. 5, 2003).
4 See National Biotechnology Information Assessment Program/Information Systems for
Biotechnology, TablesforField Test Releases, athttp://www.isb.vt.edulcfdocs/isbtables.cfm
(last updated Feb. 27, 2003) [hereinafter Tables for Field Test Releases].
" Rachel Massey, Biotech: The Basics-Part 1, RACHEL'S ENVT. & HEALTH NEWS (Jan. 17,
2001), at http://www.rachel.org/bulletin/pdf/Rachels.EnvironmentHealth-News_1931 .pdf.
49 To identify these risks is not to discount the very real and meaningful environmental
benefits that these crops potentially offer. Experience in China, for example, suggests that
use of these Bt crops can dramatically reduce reliance on pesticides. Leslie Ryan, GM
Crops-Savior or Saboteur? Agricultural Biotechnology in China Today, 2001 COLO. J.
INT'L ENVTL. L & POL'Y 203, 205-206 (2001). Considering that pesticide contamination is
a major public health and ecological threat, these crops will likely provide significant benefits
if properly managed.
50 See, e.g., L.L. Wolfenbarger & P. R. Phifer, The Ecological Risks and Benefits of
602 [Vol. 27:593
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useless (of particular concern because, to date, the largest class of GM crops
have been modified to express Bt-a unique natural pesticide critical to
organic farming) but might also ripple through the ecosystem in unpredictable
and unknown ways.5' Moreover, contamination from pollen drift threatens to
create an adventitious presence of GM genes in non-GM crops, permanently
altering the gene pool of the crops with foreign genes not approved for
consumption in many parts of the world,52 and possibly threatening the
traditional right of farmers to save seeds for future planting.53 These
Genetically Engineered Plants, SCIENCE, Dec. 15, 2000, at 2088, available at
http://www.sciencemag.org.
51 Id. See also John Harte, Land Use, Biodiversity, and Ecosystem Integrity: The Challenge
of Preserving Earth's Life Support System, 27 ECOLOGY L.Q. 929, 958 (2001); Deepak
Saxena et al., Insecticidal Toxin in Root Exudatesfrom Bt Corn, 402 NATURE 480,480 (Dec.
2 1999), available at http://www.nature.com/nature/ (expressing concern that a released
GMO might alter the natural ecosystem and have enormous effects on natural biodiversity).
52 Bruce Barcott, Seeds of Discord, LEGAL AFF., Jan./Feb. 2003, at 60, available at
http://www.legalaffairs.org; Norman C. Ellstrand, When Transgenes Wander, Should We
Worry?, 125 PLANT PHYSIOLOGY 1543, 1545 (2001), available at
http://www.plantphysiol.org; Neil E. Harl, Genetically Modified Food Crops: Guidelinesfor
Producers, available at http://www.extension.iastate.edu/Pages/grain/publications/buspub/
0010harll.pdf (last visited April 15, 2003); Carol Norris & Jeremy Sweet, Monitoring Large
Scale Releases of Genetically Modified Crops (EPG1/5/84) Incorporating Report on Project
EPG 1/5/30: Monitoring Releases of Genetically Modified Crop Plants (final report of
monitoring studies of field scale releases of GM oilseed rape crops in England from 1994-
2000), available at http://www.defra.gov.uk/environment/gm/research/epg- 1-5-84.htm (Dec.
24, 2002). One frightening report of GM contamination involved a native variety of corn in
Mexico-a country that had not even approved commercial planting of the GM variety
detected. Carol Kaesuk Yoon, Genetic Modification Taints Corn in Mexico, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 2, 2001, at F7. In April 2002, however, an article in Nature, which published the
original research on the presence of genetically modified genes found in native maize
varieties in a region of Mexico (David Quist & Ignacio H. Chapela, Transgenic DNA
Intogressed into Traditional Maize Races in Oaxaca, Mexico, 414 NATURE 541 (2001)),
concluded that the claim "that these transgenes have pervaded the entire native maize genome
is unfounded." Nick Kaplinsky et al., Maize Transgene Results in Mexico are Artifacts, 416
NATURE 601 (2002).
" The most famous case to date involves Percy Schmeiser, a Canadian farmer locked in
patent infringement litigation with Monsanto over his use of saved seeds that had been cross-
fertilized by neighbors' Roundup Ready crops. Schmeiser v. Monsanto, [2002 F.C.A. 448,
available at http://decisions.fct-cf.gc.ca/fct/2002/2002fca309.html (last visited Apr. 5, 2003).
See also In re Trantham, 286 B.R. 650 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 2002); Monsanto v. Byrd, 2000
WL 33952260 (E.D.N.C. Dec. 11, 2000); Repp, Comment, Biotech Pollution: Assessing
Liabilityfor Genetically Modified Crop Production and Genetic Drift, 36 IDAHO L. REV. 587
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significant and difficult to manage risks, which are unique to GM crops, are
not part of USDA's plant pest calculus.54
For most GM field trials-a necessary step in the approval
process-USDA requires only advance notice,55 and does not engage in a
permitting process.56 After receiving an advance notification, USDA has ten
to thirty days to acknowledge that the field trial is appropriate or to deny
permission.57 To date, USDA has received advance notice of thousands of
field trials.58
Once a GM crop has been field tested, its developer can petition to
obtain nonregulated status 59 and approval for commercial sales.60 USDA will
approve the petition if it concludes that granting nonregulated status will not
(2000).
'4 COMM. ON GENETICALLY MODIFIED PEST-PROTECTED PLANTS, NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL,
GENETICALLY MODIFIED PEST-PROTECTED PLANTS: SCIENCE AND REGULATION (2000)
(explaining that USDA does not consider insect resistance to be a plant pest risk). For a
description of the resistance problem, see Bratspies, supra note 37, at 306-07.
" Notification for the Introduction of Certain Regulated Articles, 7 C.F.R. § 340.3(a) (2003).
This position contrasts sharply with the European Union's regulatory approach. The EU
requires regulatory approval at each and every step from laboratory testing to field testing
and final marketing. See Council Directive 90/219/EEC, 1990 O.J. (L 117) 1, 1 (regulating
situations in which release into the environment is not intended); Council Directive
90/220/EEC, 1990 O.J. (L 117) 15, 15 (regulating both the deliberate release into the
environment and the marketing of genetically modified organisms). An indication of the
European perspective can be found in the preamble to Regulation (EC) No. 258/97, which
states in part that "to protect public health, it is necessary to ensure that novel foods and
novel food ingredients are subject to a single safety assessment through a Community
procedure before they are placed on the market within the Community." Commission
Regulation 258/97, 1997 O.J. (L 43) 1. Because of alleged uncertainties about the safety of
these crops, in June 1999 the EU imposed a de facto moratorium on approvals of new GM
crops. Chantal Nielson & Kym Anderson, Global Market Effects of Alternative European
Responses to GMO's, at 3, available at http://www.adelaide.edu.au/cies/0032.pdf (July
2000); Tables for Field Test Release, supra note 47.
56 7 C.F.R. § 340.3(a).
" Id. § 340.3(e).
58 Tables for Field Test Releases, supra note 47.
" Petition for Determination of Nonregulated Status, 7 C.F.R. § 340.6(a) (2003). After
receiving a petition, USDA publishes a notice in the Federal Register and accepts comments
for sixty days. 7 C.F.R. § 340.6(d)(2) (2003). USDA has one hundred and eighty days to
deny or approve the petition. 7 C.F.R. § 340.6(d)(3) (2003).
60 Restrictions on the Introduction of Regulated Articles, 7 C.F.R. § 340.0(a)(1) (2002).
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create a plant pest risk.6' USDA has approved the vast majority of GM crop
petitions for nonregulated status62 with more than fifty transgenic crops
deregulated since 1992.63
2. FDA Oversight
The FDA derives broad regulatory authority over foods from the
Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetics Act ("FFDCA").' Under the FFDCA, the
agency has the power: 1) to identify and remove "adulterated foods" from the
human food supply;65 2) to regulate food'labeling; 66 and 3) to approve all food
additives before they are marketed. 67 FDA thus has the power to remove
unsafe foods from the marketplace 68 and to hold producers legally responsible
for the safety of the foods they market.69 Had FDA embraced these powers
and tightly regulated the introduction of GM foods to the marketplace, the
StarLink crisis could never have happened. Instead, under the aegis of the
Framework, FDA made a series of critical policy decisions that drastically
limited the scope of its regulatory oversight of the new technology.7"
Two separate provisions of the FFDCA could have given FDA
significant authority over GM crops.7' Section 402(a)(1) of the FFDCA
61 Because granting nonregulated status would be a major federal action that might have
significant impacts on the environment under the National Environmental Policy Act
("NEPA"), USDA must conduct an environmental assessment before making a decision on
the petition. 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (c) (2000); NEPA Rules, 40 C.F.R. §§ 1500-1508 (2003). See
also USDA/APHIS Petition 96-317-01p for Determination of Nonregulated Status for Insect-
Resistant/Glyphosate-Tolerant Corn Line MON 802 Environmental Assessment and Finding
of No Significant Impact, May 1997 [hereinafter MON 802 FONSI], available at
http://www.aphis.usda.gov/biotech/decdocs/9631701 p-ea.HTM (illustrating an instance of
the need for an environmental assessment under NEPA requirements).
62 Tables for Field Test Releases, supra note 47.
63 See id.
6 Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetics Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-399 (2000).
65 FFDCA § 304(a), (b), 21 U.S.C. § 334(a), (b) (2000).
66 FFDCA § 403, 21 U.S.C. § 343 (2000).
67 FFDCA § 409(b)-(d), 21 U.S.C. § 348(b)-(d) (2000).
61 FFDCA § 304, 21 U.S.C. § 334 (2000).
69 FFDCA § 303(a), 21 U.S.C. § 333(a) (2000).
70 Statement of Policy: Foods Derived from New Plant Varieties, 57 Fed. Reg. 22,984,
22,984-85 (May 29, 1992) [hereinafter 1992 FDA Policy].
"' The FFDCA also gives FDA the power to regulate and require food labeling. Under
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defines a food as adulterated "[i]f it bears or contains any poisonous or
deleterious substance which may render it injurious to health. 72 Because
many GM crops have been modified to produce pesticides, this provision
could have given FDA unique regulatory authority over the foods produced
from these crops. Similarly, under section 402(b)(2), a food is adulterated "if
any substance has been substituted wholly or in part therefor. '' 73 This
provision creates a category of adulterated food, defined in terms of a
manufacturing process that includes use of an unapproved food additive. No
food additive can be used in human food unless FDA has either determined
that the additive is generally regarded as safe ("GRAS"), or has issued
specific regulations addressing use of that particular food additive.74 In other
words, FDA must either require pre-market approval of food additives or
must determine that the additive is GRAS. Because most GM crops involve
the addition of genes that code for novel proteins (notably pesticide proteins
FFDCA §403(a)(1), 21 U.S.C. § 343(a)(1), a food is misbranded, and therefore subject to
enforcement action, if its labeling is false or misleading in any particular. Under FFDCA
section 201(n), 21 U.S.C. § 321(n), a label is also misleading if it fails to reveal any material
facts about the food. While the legislative history of FFDCA section 201(n) contains little
discussion of the word "material," FDA has historically interpreted this materiality language
to refer to information about the attributes of the food itself. See, FDA, Guidance for
Industry, Voluntary Labeling Indicating Whether Foods Have or Have Not Been Developed
Using Bioengineering, Draft Guidance (Jan. 2001), available at http://vm.cfsan.fda.gov/-
dms/bioabgu.html. In determining which facts are material, and thus subject to a labeling
requirement, FDA has rejected calls that the process of genetic engineering alone should
trigger a labeling requirement. Id. FDA currently requires labeling of GM food products
only when changes in the food composition (e.g., different nutritional property, addition of
an allergen) "warrant labeling." Id. This is an extremely restrictive reading of its statutory
mandate. Most GM food products produced from genetically modified ingredients need not
be labeled. This Draft Labeling Guidance was intended to assist manufacturers who wished
to voluntarily indicate whether foods were made with bioengineered ingredients. Id. The
guidance would have aided manufacturers in ensuring that their labeling is truthful and not
misleading.
72 FFDCA § 402(a)(1), 21 U.S.C. § 342(a)(1) (2000).
7 FFDCA § 402(b)(2), 21 U.S.C. § 342(b)(2).
74 FFDCA § 301(a), 21 U.S.C. § 331 (a) (2000) (prohibiting introduction of adulterated foods
into interstate commerce). Adulterated foods include those containing a food additive
determined as unsafe under FFDCA section 409, 21 U.S.C. § 348 (2000). FFDCA §
402(a)(1), 21 U.S.C. § 342(a)(1)(C)(I). FFDCA section 409(a), 21 U.S.C. § 348(a) excepts
a food additive from a determination of unsafe if exempted under another provision under
the section. Substances determined to be GRAS also fall outside regulation as food additives
under FFDCA section 409, 21 U.S.C. § 348. 1992 FDA Policy, 57 Fed. Reg. at 22,985.
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like Bt), this authority could also have been the basis for extensive FDA
oversight of GM crops.
However, in 1992, FDA rejected an expansive view of its regulatory
authority when the agency published its Statement of Policy: Foods Derived
from New Plant Varieties.75 Under this policy, FDA ceded its authority to
regulate pesticides incorporated into foods to EPA.76 FDA also elected not to
promulgate regulations to deal specifically with GM foods as a class, but
instead to apply existing food additive regulations.77
FDA based this decision on a critical assumption-that GM foods
were the substantial equivalent of conventional crops.78 Under a substantial
equivalent analysis, GM foods are considered mere variants of existing, well-
accepted foods. This assumption of "substantial equivalence" has significant
regulatory consequences.
As the "substantial equivalent" of conventional crops, GM foods are
treated as though they present no different or greater safety concern than
foods developed by traditional plant breeding. 79 FDA thus makes little or no
distinction between the foods that are the product of conventional breeding
and those that are the product of modem genetic engineering.80 Because GM
foods are considered the "substantial equivalent" of products already on the
market, FDA treats GM foods as presumptively GRAS. Thus, FDA requires
neither pre-market review nor labeling of these crops.8 As a necessary
corollary to "substantial equivalence," FDA concluded that genes added
" 1992 FDA Policy, 57 Fed. Reg. 22,984, 22,984-85 (May 29, 1992).
76 1992 FDA Policy, 57 Fed. Reg. at 23,005. See also Dr. Marc Lappe, Biotechnology and
Agriculture, 10 MICH. ST. U. - DCL INT'L L. 39, 42 (2001) (describing FDA's position on
regulating pest protected plants ("PIP"s)).
7 1992 FDA Policy, 57 Fed. Reg. at 22,985.
78 Id. at 22,984.
79See id. For an explanation of substantial equivalence, see generally, McGarity, supra note
37, at 426-32.
'0 1992 FDA Policy, 57 Fed. Reg. at 22,984 n.3 ("'Modification' is used in a broad context
to mean the alteration in the composition of food that results from adding, deleting, or
changing hereditary traits, irrespective of the method .... Most, if not all, cultivated food
crops have been genetically modified.").
81 Id. at 22,990-91. FDA defines plant genetic modification as "the alteration of the genotype
of a plant using any technique, new or traditional." Id. at 22,984 n.3. This FDA definition
makes no distinction between the manner that traditional techniques of selective breeding
alter the genotype of a plant and the way modem biotechnology can alter the genotype of a
plant.
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through genetic engineering are not "food additives" for the purposes of the
FFDCA's stringent pre-market review provisions. 82
These substantial equivalence decisions are in sharp contrast with
European perspectives about biotechnology.8 3 European consumers are
staunchly opposed to GM crops and EU policies have reflected public
opinion on that point. To understand the EU' s position on GM crops, it must
be viewed against the backdrop of a series of spectacular and recent European
regulatory failures that put human health and environmental safety at risk:
mad cow disease, dioxin-contaminated chickens, foot-and-mouth disease-
the list goes on. These experiences have fostered an extreme precautionary
sentiment among European consumers and have created a climate in which
GM crops are greeted with profound skepticism and distrust.84 Adding to this
very real distrust of the new technology and of the government bureaucrats
as guarantors of safety, a series of social, cultural and economic factors
(including a desire to protect local agriculture) cut against ready European
adoption of these crops. As a result, the EU has soundly rejected notions of
substantial equivalence and requires GM manufacturers to demonstrate the
safety of these crops before granting regulatory approval. The result has been
a de facto moratorium on regulatory approvals.
The FDA's substantial equivalence determination may ultimately be
vindicated. When made in 1992, however, it was, and indeed remains to this
82 Id. at 22,990. "A food additive shall.., be deemed unsafe.., unless it has been exempted
or has otherwise been approved by the FDA." FFDCA § 409(a), 21 U.S.C. § 348(a) (2000).
83 The EU requires that all foodstuffs, additives and flavors containing one percent or more
genetically engineered material must be labeled. Nielson & Anderson, supra note 55, at 3;
Commission Regulation 49/2000, 2000 O.J. (L 6) 13, available at http://europa.eu.int/eur-
lex/en/index.htm. In 2002, the EU further tightened these requirements by reducing the level
of GM material allowed in products on the market to 0.5% and imposing stricter labeling
requirements. Labeling requirements will also be extended to GM crops destined for animal
feed. Labeling GM Foods to Become European Law, CHEMISTRY & INDUS., Dec. 16, 2002,
at 4, available at 2002 WL 26742195. South Korea, Japan, Australia, Mexico, China and
New Zealand have rejected FDA's vision of substantial equivalence and have instead decided
to adopt the EU's position that GM crops should be labeled. See Nielson & Anderson, supra
note 55, at 4.
84 See David Vogel & Diahanna Lynch, Council on Foreign Relations, The Regulation of
GMOs in Europe and the United States: A Case-Study of Contemporary European
Regulatory Politics, available at http://www.cfr.org/publication.php?id=3937 (last visited
Apr. 15, 2003).
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day, wholly unsubstantiated by peer-reviewed scientific studies.85 In
developing this policy, FDA conducted no independent research on the
effects of genetic engineering on foods, nor did the agency require
manufacturers to engage in such research. Instead, the policy was the product
of a political decision to smooth a path for this new technology.
Even more troubling, FDA allows manufacturers to make this GRAS
determination unilaterally. 86 This approach transfers a tremendous amount of
discretion from the regulatory authority to the regulated community.
Manufacturers need not submit vetted scientific data to convince FDA that
a GM crop is GRAS. Instead, FDA permits manufacturers to make this
evaluation entirely on their own.87 Not surprisingly, most manufacturers have
concluded that their GM products are GRAS and thus exempt from expensive
and rigorous pre-market review. Of course, even without regulation these
manufacturers do have powerful incentives not to market products they know
or suspect to be harmful. A GM food that causes an allergenic reaction or
otherwise threatens human health would be subject to FDA seizure, and the
company, including its responsible officers, might face criminal
prosecution.88 And that is not to mention tort liabilities or the devastating
effect such a product would have on the company's reputation.
85 As such, the decision runs contrary to 21 U.S.C. § 321's definition of food additive and
FDA's position that a lack of information cannot be the basis for a GRAS finding. See United
States v. 45/194 Kg. Drums of Pure Vegetable Oil, 961 F.2d 808 (9th Cir. 1992)
(demonstrating that a product is generally recognized as safe involves submitting evidence
establishing that scientifically trained experts qualified to evaluate the product believe it to
be generally recognized as safe); United States v. An Article of Food, 752 F.2d 11, 15 (1st
Cir. 1985) (declaring that a substance may be excluded from classification as a "food
additive" only if experience based on common use provides a basis for general recognition
by scientists that the substance is safe under the conditions of its intended use); Premo
Pharm. Labs., Inc., v. United States, 629 F.2d 795, 803-04 (2d Cir. 1980); United States v.
Articles of Food and Drug, 518 F.2d 743, 747 (5th Cir.1975); Weinberger v. Bentex
Pharms., Inc., 412 U.S. 645 (1972) (general recognition of safe use established by controlled
clinical studies published in recognized scientific literature).
86 1992 FDA Policy, 57 Fed. Reg. at 22,989 ("[C]ompanies developing new ingredients, new
versions of established ingredients, or new processes for producing a food or food ingredient
must make ajudgment about whether the resulting food substance is a food additive requiring
pre-market approval by FDA.").87 Id. For a stinging indictment of this laissez-faire regulatory approach, see McGarity, supra
note 37.
88 FFDCA §§ 302-304, 21 U.S.C. §§ 333(a)-304 (2000).
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As far as the safety of GM crops goes, however, known risks are not
the main concern. In addition to known risks, this new technology raises a
host of questions about possible risks-questions that FDA's substantial
equivalence policy creates no incentive to explore. In the absence of clear
FDA requirements, GM manufacturers are left to make their own decisions
about the standards of care necessary for evaluating the safety of these new
products. There is no uniform, consistent protocol of analysis that would lend
confidence to substantial equivalence determinations. Instead, these decisions
are made on an ad hoc basis at the discretion of private, profit-motivated
companies. There is a real possibility that these companies might make
risk/reward assessments that the public would find unacceptable.
FDA does provide an avenue for voluntary pre-market consultations
for GM foods. 89 This voluntary consultation process is said to help companies
and the agency determine whether food made from GM organisms contained
additives that would require pre-market approval. 90 FDA considers these pre-
market notifications to be "prudent practices" 9' on the part of producers
regardless of any legal obligation to consult. Prudent or not, without a legally
mandated approval process, FDA can only review whatever data a company
chooses to share. To date, FDA "believes" that all developers of GM foods
have consulted with the agency prior to marketing GM food in the United
States,92 but because consultations are voluntary and GM products are not
labeled in any way, FDA has no way of knowing for sure.
With no sound scientific underpinnings, FDA has come under intense
criticism for this "substantial equivalence" policy. 93 In January 2001, the
FDA proposed regulations that would have required submission of data and
information about plant-derived bioengineered foods or animal feeds at least
89 Id.
9' 1992 FDA Policy, 57 Fed. Reg. at 22,984.
9' 1992 FDA Policy, 57 Fed. Reg. at 22,991.
92 See Pre-Market Notice Concerning Bioengineered Foods, 66 Fed. Reg. 4706, 4706-38
(proposed Jan. 18, 2001) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 192, 592) [hereinafter FDA
Proposed Rule].
93 THOMAS O. MCGARrrY & PATRICIA I. HANSEN, CONSUMER FEDERATION OF AMERICA,
BREEDING DISTRUST: AN ASSESSMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVING THE
REGULATION OF PLANT DERIVED GENETICALLY MODIFIED FOODS (2001), available at
http://www.biotech-info.net/BreedingDistrust.html; Erik Millstone et al., Beyond
'Substantial Equivalence,' 401 NATURE 525, 525 (1999) (arguing for a more structured and
thorough examination of GM foods and food products).
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120 days prior to commercial distribution.94 Notification would have allowed
FDA to ensure that industry decisions and plant-derived bioengineered foods
complied with the FFDCA. The mandatory process would have replaced the
voluntary consultation process.95 After a lengthy investigation, FDA
published these regulations during the last days of the Clinton
administration.96 The new regulations would have required companies to
submit to the agency data and information regarding plant-derived
bioengineered foods that would be consumed by humans or animals. Despite
industry support for these regulations, one of the first acts of the incoming
Bush administration was to suspend and withdraw these rules for further
consideration. 97 To date the rules have not been enacted. In the fall of 2002,
Senator Dick Durbin (D-IL) introduced legislation to replace the voluntary
notification system with a mandatory pre-market approval system. This
mandatory approval system would have required GM producers to submit
much more detailed testing information and to obtain FDA approval before
marketing their product. The bill was not enacted into law, but may be
reintroduced in the 2003 legislative session.
3. EPA's Regulatory Authority
EPA has a comprehensive responsibility to examine the human health
and environmental consequences of pesticides.98 This responsibility derives
9' FDA Proposed Rule, supra note 91, at 4706.
9' Press Release, U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, FDA Announces Proposal
and Draft Guidance for Food Developed Through Biotechnology (Jan. 17, 2001), available
at http://www.cfsan.fda.gov/-lrd/hhbioen3.html.
96 See Philip Brasher, FDA Issues New Biotech Food Rules, A.P., Jan. 17, 2001, available
at http://www.biotech-info.net/FDArules.html. See generally FDA Proposed Rule, supra
note 91. See also Raymond Formanek Jr., Proposed Rules Issued for Bioengineered Foods,
FDA CONSUMER MAG. (Mar.-Apr. 2001), at http://www.fda.gov/fdac/features/2001/
201_food.html.
97 Memorandum from the Assistant to the President and Chief of Staff, White House Office,
to the Heads and Acting Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, 66 Fed. Reg. 7702
(Jan. 24, 2001) (directing that regulations sent to the Office of the Federal Register, but not
yet published, be withdrawn, and that regulations already published but not yet in effect be
postponed).
98 See FIFRA and FFDCA, as clarified by the Food Quality Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-170, 110 Stat. 1489 (1996).
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from FLFRA 99 and the FFDCA, °° and includes the duty to determine
acceptable tolerances for pesticide residues in food. Because most of the GM
crops currently on the market have been genetically modified to produce
endogenous pesticides,' °' EPA plays a critical regulatory role.
With few exceptions,0 2 no person may sell or distribute any
pesticide' 3 that is not registered under FIFRA. To be registered, a pesticide
must not cause "unreasonable adverse effects on the environment."' °4 To
determine whether an adverse effect is unreasonable, EPA must consider "the
economic, social and environmental costs and benefits of the use of any
pesticide."'0 5 A second set of criteria for FIFRA registration involve human
dietary risk from pesticide residues. 0 6 Any substance that is a pesticide under
" 7 U.S.C. § 136a(a) (2000). EPA's pesticide regulations are set out in 40 C.F.R. pts. 150-
189. Under FIFRA, EPA has no regulatory authority over plants that do not produce
pesticides. This becomes important when the issue is regulation of biopharming. See infra
Part III for an explanation of biopharming.
"~ 21 U.S.C. § 346a (2000).
... Biopesticides are only exempt from FIFRA requirements if they are derived through the
conventional breeding of sexually compatible plants. See Plant-Incorporated Protectant from
Sexually Compatible Plant, 40 C.F.R. § 174.25 (2002). See also General Qualifications for
Exemptions, 40 C.F.R. § 174.21 (2002).
02 EPA may, by regulation, exempt any pesticide from some or all of the requirements of
FIFRA if the pesticide is "of a character which is unnecessary to be subject to" FIFRA in
order to carry out the purposes of the Act. 7 U.S.C. § 136w(b)(2) (2000). EPA generally
exempts pesticides that pose low probabilities of risk to the environment in the absence of
regulatory oversight. See Regulations Under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and
Rodenticide Act for Plant Incorporated Protectants (Formerly Plant-Pesticides), 66 Fed. Reg.
37,772, 37,772-73 (July 19, 2001) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 152, 174) (Pesticides that do
not qualify for exemption can still be approved for specific uses, but only if they do not
"cause unreasonable adverse effects.").
113 The term "pesticide" is defined broadly to include, inter alia, any substance intended to
prevent, destroy or repel undesirable insects, weeds, rodents, bacteria or other living things
EPA declares to be a pest. 7 U.S.C. § 136(t), (u) (2000).
"0 7 U.S.C. § 136a(c)(5) (2000). In particular, this section of FIFRA provides that EPA shall
register a pesticide if presented with a registration application that demonstrates: (1) the
composition of the pesticide "warrant[s] the proposed claims for it;" (2) the "labeling and
other material[s] required to be submitted comply with the requirements of [FIFRA];" (3) "it
will perform its intended functions without unreasonable adverse effects to the environment;"
and (4) "when used according with widespread and commonly recognized practice it will not
generally cause unreasonable adverse effects on the environment." Id.
105 7 U.S.C. § 136(bb) (2000).
106 A pesticide residue is not safe unless EPA has issued either a tolerance for the residue
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FIFRA is automatically subject to regulation under FFDCA if used in the
production of food or food crops.° 7 If a pesticide's use is expected to cause
residues to remain on or in food, EPA will not register that use under FIFRA
unless it has also granted a tolerance under FFDCA, or has exempted the
pesticide from the tolerance requirement. A food is adulterated, and subject
to FDA enforcement authority, if it contains a pesticide residue that exceeds
this EPA designated tolerance. The tolerance is thus the residue level that
triggers an FDA enforcement action.' 8 If pesticide residues exceed the
tolerance level, the food will be subject to seizure.
EPA must set residue tolerances at a "safe" level.'0 9 In this context,
safe is defined as "a reasonable certainty that no harm will result from
aggregate exposure to the pesticide chemical residue, including all anticipated
dietary exposures .... "' "0 While this is not a zero tolerance standard-the
agency need not conclusively conclude that the pesticide poses no
harm-EPA's human dietary exposure analysis does not involve the
balancing employed in the adverse environmental effect analysis. EPA may
only exempt a pesticide from the tolerance requirement if the agency finds
that the exemption is "safe" using the "reasonable certainty of no harm"
standard. Under the FFDCA, a pesticide residue in or on food is not safe
unless EPA has issued a tolerance for the residue (and the residue is within
(and the residue is within the tolerance limits) or an exemption. See FIFRA, 7 U.S.C.
§136(bb); FFDCA, 21 U.S.C. §346a(a)(1).
o7 As for conventional pesticides, EPA must establish a tolerance level-a level of pesticide
residue that is deemed safe-before permitting foods containing Bt residues to enter the
human food chain. See FIFRA, 104 P.L. 170, § 103, 110 Stat. 1489, 1490 (1996) (codified
as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 136a-l(g)(2)). See also 21 U.S.C. § 346a (2000). In this context,
safe is defined as "a reasonable certainty that no harm will result from aggregate exposure
to the pesticide chemical residue, including all anticipated dietary exposures." 21 U.S.C. §
346a(b)(2) (2000). Again, the regulatory standard is one of reasonable, rather than absolute,
safety.
'08 In the absence of a duly promulgated tolerance or exemption, or if the residue level
detected in food exceeds the tolerance, the food is deemed adulterated under the FFDCA and
is subject to enforcement by FDA. 21 U.S.C. § 346a(a)(3)-(4).
109 FFDCA, 21 U.S.C. § 346a, 348.
"0 FFDCA, 21 U.S.C. § 346a(b)(2)(A)(ii).
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the tolerance limits)"' or has issued an exemption from the requirements of
a tolerance for the residue." 
2
Since 1994, EPA has interpreted FIFRA's pesticide registration
provisions to encompass plant incorporated protectants ("PIPs") such as the
Bt genes introduced into StarLink corn." 3 Therefore, no PIP can be sold
unless registered under FIFRA. Registration requires a demonstration that
there will be no unsafe environmental or human dietary effects from the PIP.
As part of this analysis, no PIP food crop can lawfully be sold for planting
until EPA has either established a tolerance level for the PIP or has exempted
the PIP from the tolerance requirement.' 14 To date, EPA has registered only
a few PIPs, and with one exception, all have been crops with genes that
encode Bt proteins." 5 EPA has granted many of these Bt crops exemptions
from the requirement for a tolerance level.1 6 Because the particular Bt gene
used in StarLink corn raised human allergenicity concerns, EPA did not grant
StarLink such an exception.'
A pesticide in food qualifies under the first FIFRA exemption criteria of low probability
of human dietary risk if it meets the FFDCA section 408 standard for an exemption from the
requirement of a tolerance. 66 Fed. Reg. 37,773 (Jul. 19, 2001). However, under FIFRA, a
pesticide cannot qualify for an exemption solely on the basis of consistency with FFDCA
section 408. EPA must also evaluate occupational exposure, and risks to the environment
from the pesticide. Id. at 37,774.
112 21 U.S.C. § 346a(a)(l) (2000).
1"3 1992 FDA Policy, supra note 69, at 22,984-85.
114 21 U.S.C. § 4080)(3). In the absence of a duly promulgated tolerance or exemption or if
the residue level detected in food exceeds the tolerance, the food is deemed adulterated under
the FFDCA and is subject to enforcement by FDA.
i15 See DONNA U. VOGT ET AL, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, FOOD BIOTECHNOLOGY IN THE
UNITED STATES: SCIENCE, REGULATION AND ISSUES, Jan. 19, 2001, tbl. 2, 15 (2001).
"6 Many Bt genes, and their proteins, have not shown toxicity to humans. EPA has therefore
typically granted the Bt crops exemptions from the requirement for a tolerance level. See,
e.g., 40 C.F.R. § 180.1155 (2002) (exempting CryIA(c)), 40 C.F.R. § 180.1173 (2002)
(exempting CryIA(b)). For an explanation of these decisions to exempt certain Bt genes and
proteins see 40 C.F.R. § 180.1173 (1996); 40 C.F.R. § 180.1155 (1995).
117 For StarLink corn, EPA concluded that there was a real question about the allergic
potential of the proteins produced by the transposed Bt gene Cry9C. See Kathleen Hart,
Scientists Question Test for StarLink Corn Allergy, FOOD CHEMICAL NEWS, July 23, 2001,
available at 2001 WL 12773607. Therefore, EPA did not grant the corn an exemption for
human consumption of the crop. See 40 C.F.R. § 180.1192 (2002) (limiting exemption to
feed corn).
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The StarLink fiasco revealed some gaping holes in this regulatory
regime for GM crops. The holes are the direct result of forcing the new
problems posed by biotechnology into the available answers provided by
statutes and regulations not drafted with GM crops in mind. For example,
EPA did not require Aventis to compile and provide information about when
and how StarLink corn was planted.ll' Instead, EPA-viewed that information
as the province of USDA, which patently did not consider the regulatory
needs of its sister agencies before deciding to deregulate the crop entirely. As
a result, neither EPA nor FDA developed a means of tracking whether
StarLink corn entered the human food supply. EPA had the duty to regulate
StarLink's Cry9C pesticidal proteins, but did not exert this duty over the
plants that produced the toxins. Similarly, FDA was responsible for
regulating food safety, but evaluated the safety of StarLink corn without
considering the possible health effects, including allergenicity, of the
incorporated pesticidal proteins. By relying on existing law in lieu of new
statutes, the Framework thus prompted the agencies to maintain illogical
regulatory divisions. Although the Framework is not law and cannot replace
statutory mandates, the agencies used the Framework to interpret these
statutory mandates narrowly and in ways that actually hindered the
development of an effective oversight program.
II. THE STARLINK CRISIS
A. StarLink's Registration Process
More than thirty StarLink field trials were conducted in 1996 and
1997 under USDA' s notification procedure." 9 On February 23, 1998, USDA
published notice that Aventis had petitioned for a determination that StarLink
corn did not pose a plant pest risk and should be granted non-regulated
11 Proposed Policy; Plant-Pesticides Subject to the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and
Rodenticide Act and the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 59 Fed. Reg. 60,496 (Nov.
23, 1994).
19 See Information System for Biotechnology, at http:llwww.isb.vt.edu (last visited April
14), for the underlying information. See also D.L. Uchtmann, StarLink-A Case Study, 7
DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 159 (2002).
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status.1 20 On May 15, 1998, USDA announced that it would grant the
StarLink petition for non-regulated status. 21 *.At the same time Aventis began the USDA field trials, the company
also initiated voluntary consultations with FDA. In March of 1998, Aventis
submitted information to FDA to support its safety and nutritional assessment
of StarLink corn. 22 Even though the central food safety question was
allergenicity-a food safety issue normally under jurisdiction of FDA-the
Framework and FDA's 1992 Policy assigned EPA primary regulatory
authority. Moreover, under the 1992 Policy, FDA relied on Aventis to
evaluate food safety and substantial equivalence for StarLink corn. FDA
conducted no independent analysis of these questions.
Aventis concluded that StarLink corn was not materially different in
composition, safety or other relevant parameters from corn currently on the
market. 23 With no further inquiry, FDA accepted Aventis' conclusion that
StarLink corn did not raise issues requiring pre-market review or approval by
FDA.'24 FDA carefully noted that it made no evaluation about the
allergenicity of the pesticidal protein, but only of the food itself.' 25 It was only
with EPA's evaluation of a food tolerance for Cry9C that the significant
allergenicity concerns surfaced. 26 Had FDA conducted an independent
investigation, or had FDA's inquiry included the pesticidal protein, the
question would surely have arisen sooner.
Corn containing a potentially allergenic protein is materially different
in composition and safety from corn currently on the market.' 27 If FDA had
120 63 Fed. Reg. 8,897 (February 23, 1998).
121 Determination of Nonregulated Status for Bt Cry9C Insect Resistant and Glufosinate
Tolerant Corn Transformation Event CBH-351, 63 Fed. Reg. 27,041 (May 15, 1998),
available at http://www.aphis.usda.gov/biotechldec-docs/9726501pdet.HTM; see also
generally StarLink Non-Regulated Determination, supra note 24.
122 Dep. of Health & Human Serv., Note to File BNF 041 (May 29, 1998), available at
http://www.cfsan.fda.gov/-acrobat2/bnfMO4 1.pdf.
123 Id.
124 Letter from Alan M. Rulis, Director, FDA Office of Pre-Market Approval, to Sally L. Van
Wert, Manager of Regulatory Affairs (May 29, 1998), available at http://www.cfsan.fda.
gov/-acrobat2/bnfL04 1.pdf.
125 Id.
126 Allergenicity Assessment of Cry9C Bt Corn Plant Pesticide, 64 Fed. Reg. 71,452 (Dec.
21, 1999).
127 David L. Devernoe, Note, Substantial Equivalence: A Valid International Sanitary and
Phytosanitary Risk Assessment Objective for Genetically Modified Foods, 51 CASEW. RES.
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considered the entire organism-the corn with the pesticidal protein-it
would never have been able to reach a "substantial equivalence"
determination. FDA's 1992 Policy Statement quite properly looks to the
characteristics of the introduced protein to guide the regulatory process.
1 28
StarLink corn involved the addition of a protein that had no history of safe
use in food. 29 Had the added protein not been pesticidal, and thus subject to
the artificial regulatory divisions reified by the Framework, FDA might have
been expected to ask a whole series of questions about the allergenicity and
toxicity. of the introduced protein.'30 However, under the Framework, FDA
limited its inquiry to the corn excluding the pesticide. 3' And, according to its
laissez-faire regulatory stance, FDA relied solely upon Aventis' interested
representations about the safety of StarLink before considering the
consultation complete. 1
32
Aventis thus obtained USDA "non-regulated" and FDA "substantial
equivalence" status. The company needed only an EPA pesticide registration
and food tolerance to begin full-scale marketing of the crop. Aventis initially
requested that StarLink corn be exempted from a pesticide tolerance for all
raw agricultural commodities, much the same way GM crops containing
crylA had been exempted. 33 Unlike crylA, however, cry9C codes for a
protein that shares several unusual molecular properties with known food
allergens.'34
In evaluating the data supporting Aventis' exemption request, EPA
found that some of the submitted data was "compelling and supportive of the
[registrant's claim] of 'no significant risk, '"1 35 but that large portions of the
L. REV. 257, 277 (2000) (generally arguing in favor of substantial equivalence, but
acknowledging that allergenicity concerns may be the unexpected effect of genetic
modifications, and when those concerns surface, further safety assessments will be
necessary).128FDA, Statement of Policy: Foods Derived from New Plant Varieties, 57 Fed. Reg. 22,984
(May 29, 1994).
"29 Id. at 22,984.
130 Id. at 22,999-23,000.
'3' Id. at 22,999-23,000.
132 Id. at 22,999-23,000.
13' Notice of Filing of Pesticide Petitions, 62 Fed. Reg. 49,224 (Sept. 19, 1997).
114 CDC Report, supra note 9, at 4.
"' Allergenicity Assessment of Cry9C Bt Corn Plant Pesticide, 64 Fed. Reg. 71,452 (Dec.
21, 1999).
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data were "either inconclusive or indicated that Cry9C proteins exhibit some
characteristics of known allergins."' 136 Specifically, EPA noted that the Cry9C
proteins were resistant to protease breakdown, remained stable at high
temperatures, and remained intact following four hours in simulated
mammalian gastric juices.'37 EPA determined that these characteristics
suggested a possibility that the protein might trigger allergic reactions in
humans. Because of these unresolved allergenicity concerns, EPA concluded
that Aventis failed to show that StarLink corn was "substantially equivalent
in all essential respects to its unmodified parent." 38 This failure precluded the
finding of "reasonable certainty of no harm" necessary for an exemption to
the FFDCA tolerance requirement. Similarly, because the available data was
insufficient to support the conclusion that Cry9C proteins were not potential
allergens, 3 9 EPA concluded that it could not set a tolerance level for the
proteins. Despite the fact that FDA had already signed off on Aventis'
substantial equivalence claims for the crop, the lack of an EPA exemption or
tolerance for Cry9C proteins meant that the presence of those proteins would
render food adulterated and subject to FDA enforcement.
EPA specifically indicated what data was missing, and thus prevented
a conclusion about allergenicity. There was no ambiguity. Aventis had the
responsibility to provide that data before the corn variety could be approved
for human consumption. Rather than provide the allergenicity information,
however, Aventis amended its request for an exemption to cover only corn
grown for animal feed and industrial uses. 4 ° As part of this amended request,
Aventis provided EPA with a detailed plan for keeping StarLink out of the
human food supply."'4 Under this plan, farmers purchasing StarLink were: 1)
told that corn grown from it could not be sold for human consumption; 2)
required to sign a "Grower Agreement" to that effect; and 3) sent two letters
136 id.
13' Notice of Filing of Pesticide Petitions, 62 Fed. Reg. at 49,225; see also OFFICE OF
SCIENCE COORDINATION AND POLICY, EPA, CRY9C FOOD ALLERGENICITY ASSESSMENT
BACKGROUND DOCUMENT, available upon request from http://www.epa.gov/scipoly/
oscpmail.html (on file with author).38 EPA DATA EVALUATION RECORD - SAFETY ASSESSMENT, MRID No. 44714001 (1999),
available athttp://www.epa.gov/oppbppd 1/biopesticides/pips/old/cry9c/der-44714001 a.htm.
131 CDC Report, supra note 9, at 6.
140 Matt Crenson, Rules for Genetically Modified Corn Broke Down Between Seed Plant,
Farm, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Dec. 15, 2000, at A10.
141 Id.
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of reminder about the restrictions, one at planting and one at harvest time.'42
The "Grower Guide" explained the need for a buffer strip between StarLink
and any other corn varieties, and that any corn grown within that buffer
would also have to be limited to non-food uses.'43 Finally, the company
promised to conduct a post-harvest survey to ensure that growers had
followed the rules. 44
Based on these representations about crop segregation, EPA accepted
Aventis' modified petition and registered StarLink's PIP for non-food use on
May 12, 1998.'45 This split registration was explicitly predicated on Aventis'
plan to keep StarLink out of the human food supply, and out of international
commerce. 46 As a result, EPA anticipated that there would be minimal
human dietary exposure to the Cry9C protein, with the only course of
exposure via ingestion of meat, poultry, eggs and milk from animals fed corn
containing the Cry9C protein. 47
EPA's split registration decision, combined with USDA's grant of
unregulated status, and FDA's acceptance of Aventis' substantial equivalence
assessment, paved the way for commercial production of StarLink corn for
the non-food uses that make up ninety percent of the corn market. Under the
terms of the split registration, StarLink corn could be planted for one year on
a maximum allowable acreage of 120,000 acres. 48 As express conditions of
the split registration, StarLink corn, and any corn grown within 660 feet of
it could be used only for animal feed or industrial use, and could not enter
international commerce. 49 StarLink corn's initial split registration was
renewed for the 1999 and 2000 growing seasons. 50 For the 1999 growing
142 id.
143 id.
14 Id.
145 Approval of Pesticide Product Registrations, 63 Fed. Reg. 28,258-61 (May 22, 1998).
'4 Aventis did not submit StarLink corn for regulatory approval in the EU or Japan. Thus,
when StarLink corn later turned up in shipments to these countries, its presence was a
violation of the laws of those countries as well as a violation of United States law.
147 Id. See also MIKE MENDELSOHN, EPA, PESTICIDE FACT SHEET: BT CRY9C IN CoRN 5
(Apr. 1, 2000) [hereinafter BIOPESTICIDE FACT SHEET] available upon request at
http://www.epa.gov/opprd001/factsheets/pmcontacts.htm.
'" Approval of Pesticide Product Registrations, 63 Fed. Reg. 28,258, 28,258-61 (May 22,
1998).
'
49 Id. at 28,258.
150 Id.
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season, StarLink corn could have been planted on up to 2.5 million acres,
though only about 500,000 were actually planted. In 2000, about 315,000
acres were devoted to StarLink corn." 15 Another 168,000 acres were supposed
to be planted as a buffer area that would also be restricted to non-food use to
prevent cross-pollination. 152 Together these 483,000 acres represented about
one half of the United States corn crop. 53
On April 7, 1999, EPA published Aventis' request that the split-
registration be revised to expand the tolerance exemption for Starlink corn to
include use in all food commodities, including the production of human
food. 154 In considering this request, EPA called another meeting of the FIFRA
Scientific Advisory Panel ("SAP").155EPA solicited advice by posing a series
of questions to the SAP and the general public concerning the allergenicity
risk posed by Cry9C in light of its unusual characteristics.156 The SAP met to
consider these questions, and concluded that the available data was
insufficient to make a determination about allergenicity. 157 EPA therefore
continued to deny StarLink corn full registration. Thus, for the 1998, 1999
and 2000 growing seasons, StarLink corn was not approved for human
consumption.
As a condition of the continued split registration, Aventis agreed to
ensure that all growers abided by the limitations and restrictions contained in
the registration. 158 In a January 22, 1999 letter to EPA, Aventis proposed a
" Illinois Dep't of Agriculture, StarLink Corn Information, available at http://www.agr.
state.il.us/news/Special/starlink.htm (last visited Apr. 15, 2003).152 Id.
153 StarLink Corn: How it Reached the Food Supply, supra note 2.
" 
4AgrEvo USA Company Cry9C Plant-Pesticides; Notice of Filing of Petition, 64 Fed. Reg.
16,965 (Apr. 7, 1999).
155 The SAP is an advisory committee chartered under the Federal Advisory Committee Act,
composed of independent non-agency experts, who assist the agency in assessing the risks
of pesticides. EPA, ABOUT THE SCIENTIFIC ADVISORY PANEL (SAP), available at
http://www.epa.gov/oscpmont/sap/about.htm (last visited Apr. 15, 2003).156 OFFICE OF SCI. COORDINATOR & POL'Y, EPA, supra note 136.
'7 FIFRA SAP, Open Meeting, 65 Fed. Reg. 5636 (Feb. 4, 2000); See also Assessment of
Scientific Information Concerning StarLink TM Corn Cry9C Bt Corn Plant-Pesticide, 65
Fed. Reg. 65,247 (Oct. 31, 2000).
158 BIOPESTICIDE FACT SHEET, supra note 146. Iowa was one of the primary markets for
StarLink corn. One of StarLink corn's major Iowa retailers, Garst Seeds, maintains that it
"warned farmers who bought StarLink seed that the corn produced could be used only for
feeding livestock and should not be sold into commercial channels." See Ed Lotterman,
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plan to direct the use of all StarLink corn to animal feed or industrial non-
food uses. These terms were expressly incorporated into the 2000
registration.'59 Aventis then licensed StarLink corn to a number of corn. seed
companies who distributed the corn seed to farmers.
When sold, StarLink seed sacks were supposed to bear a tag
indicating that StarLink seeds, plants, and-plant materials were to be used
domestically for animal feed or non-food industrial purposes and were not to
be used for human food or to enter international commerce. 6 ' The actual
language for at least one version of the tag stated: "Under this purchase
agreement, customer or any user may: use this hybrid corn seed or any non-
hybrid corn seeds found herein, for the purpose of producing grain for feeding
or processing.""'6 Other than this single line on the back of the tag, there was
no reference to registration restrictions. This line was wholly inadequate,
because it did not explicitly identify or explain the registration restrictions.
The word "processing," in this context, is highly ambiguous-it could readily
have referred to the normal processing channels into which growers sell
conventional corn for use as human food. Coupled with this ambiguous tag
was supposedly a Grower Agreement which reiterated the registration
restrictions. In the fall of 2000, however, Aventis was unable to produce
Grower Agreements for a significant percentage of the corn that it sold.'62
The Iowa Attorney General investigated allegations that after the crisis
Troubles that Grew with StarLink Corn Provide Lesson in Economics, Dec. 3,, 2000,
available at http://www.edlotterman.com/FrameForLink.htm."According to news accounts
after the crisis began reported that, according to many StarLink growers, "warnings were
accompanied by a wink and a nudge, together with advice to the effect that 'the government
hasn't approved it for human use yet, but this is just red tape and it will be OK by harvest
time."' Id. See also, David Barboza, Gene Altered Corn Changes Dynamics of Grain
Industry, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 2000, at Al. Many farmers and growers reported receiving
no special warnings about keeping StarLink out of the human food supply and claimed that
the seed bags bore nothing that could be considered to be a warning label. William Ryberg,
Growers of Biotech Corn Say They Weren't Warned, DES MOINES REG., Oct. 25,2000 at 1A.
' Bacillus Thuringiensis Subspecies Tolworthi Cry9C Protein and the Genetic Material
Necessary for its Production in Corn; Exemption From the Requirement of a Tolerance, 40
C.F.R. § 180.1192 (2002).
160 EPA, PETITION FOR TOLERANCE 9 (2001), available upon request at http://www.epa.gov/
epahome/question.html [hereinafter PETITION FOR TOLERANCE].
161 Bag Tag, reprinted in NEIL E. HARL ET AL., THE STARLINK SITUATION (2000), available
at http://www.mindfully.org/GE/StarLink-Situation- 15mar01.htm.
162 Crenson, supra note 139.
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unfolded, Aventis attempted to have Iowa growers sign agreements back-
dated to April 2000 (forty percent of the 2000 StarLink crop had been planted
in Iowa.)' 63 Aventis flatly denied these allegations, claiming that the
retroactive letters did not originate from the company. Aventis did not
dispute, however, that the company had failed to require many farmers to sign
Grower Agreements-a direct violation of StarLink's registration.
Aventis thus failed to comply with the grower notification
commitments that the company had made to obtain StarLink corn's split
registration. But that was only the beginning. Aventis had also explicitly
promised EPA that StarLink corn would not enter the human food supply and
would not enter international commerce. Despite these legally-binding
promises, Aventis set up neither tracking procedures, nor product testing
protocols that could have served as an oversight mechanism. Nor did Aventis
notify com elevators of the restriction on use of StarLink corn. Other than the
ambiguous seed tag, Aventis seems to have taken no steps to ensure that
StarLink was grown in accordance with its registration requirements.
StarLink's registration restrictions also required that growers plant a
660 foot buffer of non-StarLink corn around their StarLink plantings. 164 This
buffer was intended to capture any pollen drift, thereby preventing
contamination of food corn.165 Like the StarLink plantings themselves, this
buffer corn was also restricted to animal or industrial uses. 166 This registration
requirement was apparently either not communicated to the 2,070 growers
who planted StarLink corn,167 or the growers ignored the requirement. As a
result, some non-StarLink growers wound up innocently selling StarLink-
contaminated com because their crops were cross-fertilized by StarLink from
neighboring growers' fields. 168
163 Lin et al., supra note 11, at 49.
'64 StarLink Corn: How it Reached the Food Supply, supra note 2.
165 Biopesticide Fact Sheet, supra note 146. Corn is a wind pollinating, out-crossing species.
Corn pollen can travel up to one-half a mile, farther than the distance required in the StarLink
registration. Id.
166 id.
167 Kurt Eichenwald, New Concerns Rise on Keeping Track of Modified Corn, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 14, 2000, at Al.
6' Barboza, supra note 157.
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B. The Crisis and Its Aftermath
When StarLink corn was discovered in various consumer food
products in September 2000, it was in direct contravention of the product's
registration restrictions. The food products that contained StarLink corn were
adulterated under the FFDCA and indicated that Aventis had violated the
terms of the split-registration. Aventis and government agencies scrambled
to contain a growing crisis in food production and distribution. Further
investigations revealed that millions of bushels of StarLink corn had been co-
mingled with food corn in at least 350 grain elevators.169 By November 2000,
FDA had exercised its enforcement authority to recall more than 300 types
of adulterated snack chips, corn flour, and other corn foods. 70 The expense
of these recalls is estimated in the millions of dollars. 1 ' Complaints began
pouring into the Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") and the Center for
Disease Control ("CDC") about allergic reactions to corn products
attributable to StarLink contamination.'72 On October 25, 2000, FDA
requested that CDC conduct an epidemiological investigation of these reports
of human illness potentially associated with the consumption of StarLink
COrn. 173
StarLink corn also began showing up in grain shipments to Japan, the
largest foreign market for United States corn. 174 Exports to Japan, usually
around 600 million bushels annually, dropped by more than fifty percent
virtually overnight. 175 In South Korea, the second biggest importer of
American corn, thousands of tortillas were recalled because of contamination
fears. 176 Thailand began requiring importers to certify that their products were
free of StarLink contamination. 177 The European Union redoubled its
169 Eichenwald, supra note 166.
170 FDA Enforcement Report for November 1, 2000, supra note 7.
17' Glover, supra note 8.
'
72 CDC REPORT, supra note 9.
173 id.
"' Japan Says Banned Corn Used in Products, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 28, 2000; see also Business
ofBuying, FARM INDUSTRY NEWS, Dec. 30,2000,2000 WL 13070551; StarLink Corn: How
it Reached the Food Supply, supra note 2.
7 Business of Buying, supra note 173.
176 Crenson, supra note 139.
177 Allergy Fears Trigger Action on GM Maize, BANGKOK POST, Dec. 19, 2000, 2000 WL
29611501.
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opposition to GM crops. United States corn exports plunged thirty-nine
percent. Lost international sales because of StarLink presence in corn
shipments are currently the subject of a multi-district litigation in the
Northern District of Illinois. 7 ' What is not yet clear is whether StarLink
produced a localized decrease in corn exports or whether the StarLink crisis
will permanently alter these international commodities trading relationships.
As of December 2002, Japanese imports of United States corn had only
begun to return to pre-StarLink levels when a new discovery of StarLink
contamination threatened to plunge the trade relationship back into crisis.179
South Korean food processors continue to shun United States corn for food
use, turning instead to Chinese and South American suppliers." 0 Despite the
growing threat of famine in both countries, fears about GM corn prompted
Zimbabwe and Zambia to refuse United States aid shipments that included
biotech corn.'
Response to the StarLink crisis in the United States reflected how
seriously the food industry took the crisis. Giant food processors like
Kellogg, Archer Daniels Midland, and ConAgra shut down their plants to
clear StarLink contamination." 2 Upon reopening, the companies began
testing incoming shipments for StarLink contamination, turning away whole
rail cars of corn.' Things got even worse when Garst Seed, one of StarLink
corn's distributors, announced that one of its other corn hybrids unexpectedly
178 See In re StarLink Corn Products Liability Litigation, 211 F. Supp. 2d 1060 (N.D. Ill
2002). Some of the consolidated cases allege nuisance, trespass and consumer fraud in
addition to lost profits. Moreover, Aventis, the current patent holder for StarLink corn has
spent between $68 and $100 million in an attempt to purchase the outstanding stocks of
StarLink corn. Greg Frost, Starlink Was Grown in Other Countries, Oct. 31, 2000, at
http:llwww.thecampaign.orglnewsupdates/octOOii.htm. Aventis paid farmers a twenty-five
cents per bushel premium to buy back the StarLink corn.
179 Randy Fabi, Japan Got Trace of Biotech Corn, U.S. Exporters Say, TORONTO STAR, Dec.
30, 2002, at D05.
180 Id.
"81 Id. These decisions to reject GM food aid were undoubtably influenced by the prospect
that such food aid might jeopardize agricultural trade with the European Union.
"82 Victor Epstein, ConAgra Foods Reopens Mill, Boosts Testing, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD,
Oct. 27, 2000, at 34; Food Plants Running Again After StarLink Corn Scare, TORONTO
STAR, Oct. 31, 2000.
183 Bill Hord, Biotech Acceptability Worries: Farmers Carefully Weigh Options in Seed
Varieties Biotech Planting in 2000, OMAHAWORLD HERALD, Dec. 30,2000, at Business 10;
Crenson, supra note 139.
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contained the StarLink gene and that the company had no idea how the
contamination occurred. 84
Under heavy pressure from EPA, Aventis voluntarily withdrew
StarLink's United States registration in mid-October 2000. 85 In conjunction
with grain handlers, and the milling industry, Aventis also instituted
procedures to identify StarLink corn and to direct it into appropriate non-food
uses. 86 Testing revealed that about ten percent of the United States corn crop
had been contaminated with detectable amounts of the CRY9C proteins
found in StarLink corn-an unsettlingly high percentage. '87 Most of the 2000
StarLink crop was ultimately repurchased by USDA and Aventis, and
channeled to animal feed. But federal officials and Aventis were unable to
locate about 1.5% of the 2000 crop, or about 1.2 million bushels.'88 And, of
course, the earlier crops had already been sold to food producers.'89
In a move that outraged critics, Aventis sought to deal with the
problem of StarLink contamination of the human food supply by requesting
that EPA grant CRY9C a limited retroactive tolerance.' 9° Claiming that
removing StarLink completely from the human food supply was impossible,
Aventis essentially asked EPA to ratify its failure to comply with the
registration requirements by retroactively approving StarLink corn for human
consumption.' 9' This request was for a four year temporary tolerance to cover
any CRY9C protein and cry9c DNA that might be present in human food
'
84 Troy Goodman, Expert: StarLink Biotech Corn a Test Case for Regulatory Needs, Nov.
30, 2000, at http://www.cnn.com/2000/FOOD/news/l 1/30/starlink.epa/.
185 Press Release, EPA, EPA Statement on Aventis Withdrawing StarLink Maize (2000), at
http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/global/biotech/00101 304.htm.
'86 Some of these steps are detailed in PETITION FOR TOLERANCE, supra note 159, at 20-30.
87 Anthony Shadid, Tests for Genetic Corn Spur Concerns, Amounts of Disputed Variety
Found in 10% of US Grain Inspections, BOSTON GLOBE, May 3, 2001, at C1.
188 Experts: Worries About Biotech Corn Are Overblown, Nov. 14, 2000, at
http://www.cnn.com/2000/FOOD/news/1 1/14/biotech.corn.02.
189 Because crops are routinely co-mingled at grain elevators, tiny amounts of StarLink
ultimately tainted billions of bushels of corn. Indeed, there were estimates that one half of
Iowa's corn crop would end up mixed with StarLink. David Barboza, Negligence Suit is
Filed Over Altered Corn, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 2000, at C2.
90 Notice of Request for 20 Parts Per Billion Tolerance of Cry9C in Corn, 66 Fed. Reg. 31,
915 (June 13, 2001); Notice of Filing a Pesticide Petition to Establish a Tolerance for a
Certain Pesticide Chemical In or On Food, 66 Fed. Reg. 33,078 (June 20, 2001).
'9' Updated Safety Assessment of StarLink Corn Containing Cry9C Protein, Oct. 25, 2000,
available at http://www.biotech-info.net/AventisFinalStarLink.pdf.
2003] 625
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV.
made from StarLink corn planted in 1998, 1999, and 2000.'92 In support of
this application, Aventis submitted additional scientific information about
allergenicity1 93
EPA convened another SAP meeting on November 28, 2000 to
consider this new information and to revisit whether CRY9C was a potential
human allergen.' 9 EPA's charge to the SAP included a request that the SAP
evaluate the likelihood that CRY9C is a food allergen, and whether the levels
of CRY9C present in the United States diet would be sufficient to cause
significant allergic reactions in exposed populations.' 95 EPA provided the
SAP its initial evaluation of the materials submitted by Aventis.' 9 For each
variable, EPA used more conservative estimates than had Aventis.' 97 As a
result, EPA's estimate of the concentration of CRY9C in StarLink corn, and
the StarLink contamination in the United States' food supplies were
significantly higher than those provided by Aventis"9 The SAP considered
Aventis' submissions and EPA's evaluation and issued a final report on in
early December 2000.1" The report expressed the panel's consensus that
CRY9C had a "medium likelihood" to be an allergen but that the expression
level of the protein and the amount of StarLink that had likely been co-
mingled posed a "low probability" of allergic responses. .200 Based on these
SAP findings, EPA ultimately denied the requested tolerance.
192 Notice of Request for 20 Parts Per Billion Tolerance of Cry9C in Corn, 66 Fed. Reg. at
31,915 (June 13, 2001); Notice of Filing a Pesticide Petition to Establish a Tolerance for a
Certain Pesticide Chemical In or On Food, 66 Fed. Reg. at 33,078.
193 Notice of Filing a Pesticide Petition to Establish a Tolerance for a Certain Pesticide
Chemical in or on Food, 66 Fed. Reg. at 33,078.
'
94 FIFRA Science Advisory Panel: Notice of Public Meeting, 65 Fed. Reg. 66,750 (Nov. 7,
2000).
195 EPA, QUESTIONS FOR THE FIFRA SCIENTIFIC ADVISORY PANEL, ASSESSMENT OF
SCIENTIFIC INFORMATION CONCERNING STARLINK CORN CRY9C, BT PLANT-PESTICIDE (Nov.
28, 2000), available at http://www.epa.gov/scipoly/sap/2000/november/cry9csapqs.pdf.
196 EPA, EPA PRELIMINARY EVALUATION OF INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THE OCTOBER 25,
2000 SUBMISSION FROM AVENTIS CROPSCIENCE (2000), available at http:llwww.epa.gov/
scipoly/sap/2000/november/prelim_ eval_sub 102500.pdf.
19q Id. at 14-21.
198 Id.
199 EPA, ASSESSMENT OF SCIENTIFIC INFORMATION CONCERNING STARLINK CORN 19-21
(2000), available at http://www.epa.gov/scipoly/sap/2000/november/one.pdf.200 Id. at 9-14.
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On January 19, 2001, five years after FDA had concluded its
consultation with Aventis over StarLink corn, and months after StarLink
contamination had been discovered, FDA issued Guidance on how to sample
and test corn to identify StarLink contamination. 20' Also in January 2001,
Aventis and the Attorneys General of seventeen states reached an agreement
whereby Aventis agreed to pay growers a twenty-five cents per bushel
premium over market corn prices to repurchase the StarLink crop.20 2 In March
of that year, Kraft Foods and other affected manufacturers entered into a
multi-million dollar settlement with consumers allegedly affected by StarLink
contamination.203 Aventis indemnified these manufacturers for their
liability.2 4 In May 2001, the Missouri Attorney General sued Aventis,
claiming that the company did not adequately educate farmers on how to keep
StarLink out of the human food supply.205 The suit seeks damages on behalf
of Missourians who could not sell their corn or get the price that they
otherwise would have gotten if their corn had not been StarLink or mixed
with StarLink.2 Similar individual suits were consolidated in a multi-district
litigation in the Northern District of Illinois.2 7
201 CTR. FOR FOOD SAFETY & APPLIED NUTRITION, FDA, GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY, FDA
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SAMPLING AND TESTING YEU.OW CORN AND DRY-MILLED YELLOW
CORN SHIPMENTS FOR CRY9C PROTEIN REsIDUEs (2001) [hereinafter FDA CORN GUIDANCE],
available at http://vm.cfsan.fda.gov/-dms/starguid.html.
202 Aventis has also agreed to pay $100 million to settle a whole series class action and
putative class action suits brought on behalf of farmers who grew non-StarLink corn and
claimed to have been injured because of Cry9C's presence in the United States corn supply.
See In re StarLink Corn Products Liability Litigation, Settlement Class Certification,
Proposed Settlement and Fairness Hearing, MDL #1403, Feb. 14, 2003, available at
http://www.non-starlinkfarmerssettlement.com.
20' In re StarLink Corn Products Liability Litigation, N.D. Ill., MDL #1403, Mar. 7, 2002,
available at http://www.jpml.uscourts.gov/PendingMDLs/ProductsLiability/MDL-1403
/mdl-1403.htnl. See also Judge Approves $9 Million Settlement in Class Action Over
StarLink Corn, PRODUCTS LIABIIY DAILY, Mar. 21, 2002.
24 Judge Approves $9 Million Settlement in Class Action Over StarLink Corn, supra note
203.
205 See Eric Palmer, Missouri Attorney General Files Suit Over Bioengineered Corn, KAN.
CrrY STAR, May 5, 2001, at C8.206 Id.
207 In re StarLink Corn Products Liability Litigation, N.D. Ill., MDL #1403, Mar. 7, 2002,
available at http://www.jpml.uscourts.gov/PendingMDLs/ProductsLiability/MDL- 1403
/mdl- 1403.html.
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III. REGULATORY FLAWS
Fears about potential allergic reactions to StarLink corn are abating
in the scientific community." 8 The SAP ultimately concluded that although
there was a "medium likelihood" that StarLink corn was allergenic, so little
of the corn made its way into the food supply that there was only a "low
probability" that consumers would actually develop allergies to it.2°9 The
incident nonetheless raises serious questions about the adequacy of the
Framework, and of the GM regulatory scheme in general. The presence of
StarLink corn in human food was unambiguously unlawful, rendering the
foods in question adulterated under the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act,2'0 and
violating the corn's Plant Incorporated Pesticide Registration.21' Simply put,
this corn should never, under any circumstances, have found its way into the
human food supply. The fact that not enough StarLink corn entered the food
supply to be particularly harmful is the result of the vigilance of anti-GM
activists, not the effectiveness of the Framework or the regulatory scheme it
created. 2 But for the hypervigilance of staunch GM opponents, it is unlikely
208 See CDC REPORT, supra note 9. Blood tests failed to find signs of antibodies to the protein
in the genetically engineered corn. Thus, the federal Center for Disease Control and
Prevention concluded that although the study participants may have experienced allergic
reactions, based upon the results of their study alone, CDC "could not conclude that a
reported illness was a [StarLink] allergic reaction." CDC also cautioned that they could not
rule out the possibility because food allergies may occur without detectible serum antibodies
to the antigen.
209 FIFRA SAP, ASSESSMENT OF SCIENTIFIC INFORMATION CONCERNING STARLINKTM CORN,
SAP Report No. 2000-06 (2000), available at http://www.epa.gov/scipoly/sap/2000/
index.htm.
20 Under 21 U.S.C. § 346a(a)(1) (2000) and 21 U.S.C. § 342(a)(2)(B) (2000), the presence
of StarLink corn or Cry9C in human food products rendered those products adulterated under
the federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act. Pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 331(a), the introduction
of an adulterated food into interstate commerce is illegal.
2' See Bacillus Thuringiensis subspecies tolworthi Cry9C Protein and the Genetic Material
Necessary for its Production in Corn: Exemption From the Requirement of a Tolerance, 63
Fed. Reg. 28,258 (May 22, 1998). This exemption regulation eliminated the need to establish
a maximum permissible level for residues of this plant pesticide in, or on, corn used for feed,
as well as in meat, poultry, milk or eggs resulting from animals fed such feed. The exemption
specifically did not permit human consumption of the StarLink corn itself.
22 Senator Durbin (D-Ill.) alleged that EPA knew as early as 1998 that conventional corn was
contaminated with StarLink proteins but took no action to remedy the problems. See Durbin
Says EPA Knew of Possible StarLink Problems in 1998, FOOD & DRINK WKLY., Dec. 11,
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that the registration violations at the heart of the crisis would ever have come
to light absent a public health catastrophe.
The government had no mechanism to oversee the registration
restrictions and no means of verifying compliance. Safety depended solely
upon voluntary, unmonitored compliance from a regulated community that
fell woefully short of the mark. It is not at all clear that critical registration
requirements were even communicated to the growers actually planting,
harvesting and selling StarLink corn. For example, in contravention of a clear
registration requirement, Aventis did not ensure that its growers contractually
committed to following any procedures designed to keep StarLink corn from
the human food supply. 21 3 Some growers contended that they were never told
of StarLink corn's use restrictions and others said that they were told not to
worry about segregation because EPA approval was expected shortly.214
Others claimed that the tag affixed to StarLink corn misleadingly suggested
that the corn could be used for human food.
Were StarLink an isolated incident, it would be troubling, but at least
it would be nearly over. But there are other Bt hybrids subject to the same lax
regulatory scheme. Like StarLink corn, these other Bt crop registrations
include numerous detailed provisions intended to protect human health and
the environment, most notably by inhibiting the development of insect
resistance to Bt as a pesticide.2"5 Resistance to Bt would be a serious problem
for organic and conventional farmers who rely on Bt as a component of their
crop protection arsenal. Everyone, both GM advocates and their opponents,
agree that pest resistance to Bt is a real problem and that measures must be
taken to impede or prevent the evolution of such resistance. The StarLink
fiasco raises a real concern that, as to these other GM crops, environmental
protections are implemented in exactly the same way as StarLink corn's use
2000, available at 2000 WL 30905574. If true, EPA apparently registered and re-registered
StarLink corn in the face of evidence that the registration restrictions were patently
inadequate. These allegations suggest that agency failures are even more significant than
described in this Article.
213 Eichenwald, supra note 166.
214 Barnaby J. Feder, Farmers Cite Scarce Data in Corn Mixing, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17, 2000,
at Cl.
25 See Agricultural Biotechnology Stewardship Technical Committee, Bt Corn Insect
Resistance Management Survey: 2000 Growing Season, Jan. 31, 2001, available at
http://www.ncga.com/biotechnology/insectMgmtPlan/pdf/finalIRMsumnarysurvey.pdf
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restrictions (i.e., not at all).21 6 Realistically speaking, these environmental
safety restrictions are just as unenforceable as was StarLink's "no human
food use" restriction, and for exactly the same reason. Without knowing
where GM crops are planted, independent oversight is simply not possible.
Even more troubling, Bt crops are merely the tip of the iceberg. In
particular, the prospect of corn biopharming in the corn belt poses serious
contamination and food safety issues. Biopharming involves inserting genes
into plants to make them manufacture drugs, vaccines, enzymes, antibodies,
hormones or industrial chemicals such as plastics, detergents, and adhesives.
Right now, biopharming is the cutting edge of biotechnology. Although
biopharming uses corn as its production vehicle, biopharm crops are not food
and are not intended for human consumption. According to some predictions,
at least ten percent of United States agricultural lands will be devoted to
biopharming by the end of the decade.217
Nothing prevents these biopharm crops from being planted near corn
intended for human consumption. As such, biopharming challenges the
Framework in new and more fundamental ways. The likelihood of
commingling is real. For example, in December 2002, USDA announced that
ProdiGene, Inc. had failed to comply with strict guidelines for completely
removing a biopharming crop in two separate locations, one in Nebraska and
the other in Iowa.2" At both sites, a grower under contract to ProdiGene had
failed to remove volunteer corn before planting soybeans on the same land.2"9
Unlike StarLink corn, which had received full USDA regulatory clearance,
216 In December 2002, the Philippines approved a Bt crop, Monsanto's YieldGuard corn
borer, for use in the next growing season. Leilani M. Gallardo, FOCUS Bt Corn-More
Harm Than Good, or Vice Versa?, Bus. WORLD (Philippines), Jan. 9, 2003, at 1. The
Philippines did not, however, adopt the resistance management plans deemed essential to safe
use of the crop. Rather the Ministry of Agriculture announced that farmers would be
instructed to either plant Bt crops every other year, or to use non-corn crops as refuges to
prevent resistance. In a region where farmers routinely save seeds for planting, the former
option is completely unenforceable, and United States scientists have soundly rejected the
adequacy of the second option to preserve insect susceptibility.
217 Aaron Zitner, Fields of Gene Factories, L.A. TIMES, June 4, 2001, at Al; Scott Kilman,
Food, Biotech Industries Feud Over Plansfor Bio-Pharming, WALL ST. J., Nov. 5, 2002, at
B7.
218 USDA Investigates Biotech Company for Possible Permit Violations, Nov. 13, 2002, at
http://aphisweb.aphis.usda.gov/lpa/news/2002/1 /prodigene.html.
219 Feds Probe Biotech Firm for Crop Mixing, Nov. 12, 2002, at http:llwww.cnn.con2002/
US/i 1/14/biotech.contamination/.
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biopharming is still experimental. Therefore, the ProdiGene sites were still
subject to federal inspection. Inspectors discovered corn that had been
engineered to produce a swine vaccine growing amidst soybeans in a field
that had been planted with the biopharming corn a year earlier.22°
Volunteer plants of this sort are not uncommon. For biopharming to
work safely, the public must be able to trust that growers will take all
necessary steps to eradicate such volunteers. In the ProdiGene incidents, the
grower was told to destroy the corn plants to prevent the possibility of
contamination.22' Instead of complying, the grower simply harvested the
fields and sent the soybeans to an elevator, where they were mixed with the
soybeans already present in the elevator.222 Stalks and leaves from the
bioengineered corn were discovered mixed with the soybeans. 223 Because of
contamination fears, regulators ordered the destruction, not only of all the
soybeans in the elevator, but also of ordinary corn fields that had surrounded
the biopharm corn. 224 USDA levied a significant fine against the company,
but the underlying problem remains .225 The grower had not been careful-had
not taken to heart the need to prevent cross-contamination and to keep its
swine vaccine corn out of the human food supply. Nor had ProdiGene taken
any steps to ensure grower compliance with the clear and legally binding
220 Agriculture Department Fines ProdiGene for Biotech Mishaps (Dec. 7, 2002), at
http://earthboundfarm.com/news-world/GMOfine.html.
221 Philip Brasher, Biotech Corn May Have Tainted Soybeans, DES MOINES REG., Nov. 13,
2002, at IA.
222 Id.
223 Corn Near Gene-Altered Site to be Destroyed, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2002, at C10.
224 Id. See also Philip, supra note 220.
225 Press Release, Matt Lloyd & Jerry Redding, USDA Announces Actions Regarding Plant
Protection Act Violations Involving ProdiGene Inc. (Dec. 6, 2002), available at4
http://www.usda.gov/news/releases/2002/12/0498.htm. ProdiGene was assessed a $250,000
fine, and required to pay more than $3 million to repurchase the soybeans and to clean the
silo. See Christopher Doering, ProdiGene to Spend Millions on Bio-Corn Tainting, Sept. 12,
2002, at http://www.planetark.org/avantgo/dailynewsstory.cfm?newsid= 18935.
Prodigene also agreed to a $1 million bond and higher compliance
standards, including additional approvals before field testing and
harvesting genetically modified material. The company will develop a
written compliance program with USDA to ensure that its employees,
agents, cooperators and managers are aware of, and comply with, the Plant
Protection Act, federal regulations and permit conditions.
Lloyd & Redding, supra.
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requirements about how this biopharm crop must be handled.226 In this case,
none of the biopharmed corn made it into the food supply, but it was a close
call.
ProdiGene is not alone. As 2002 drew to a close, EPA announced it
had levied fines against two more biopharming firms, this time in Hawaii, for
failure to properly manage biopharming crops.227 Dow Agrosciences and
Pioneer Hi-Bred were both fined for failure to take proper measures to
prevent commercial crops intended for human consumption from being
contaminated with experimental biopharmed corn.2
28
Because they are viewed as an economic boon, Biopharm crops are
being rushed into production with little or no attention to control
mechanisms-and with even less attention to the grower education that must
be the centerpiece of any safety program. Meanwhile, the StarLink corn
fiasco suggests what the outcome will be. The next violation may not be
caught in time, and the next crisis might not be so benign. The integrity of the
United States food supply could be placed in jeopardy.
Even though EPA has vowed never to issue another registration for
a genetically modified food crop unapproved for human consumption,
biopharming provides a fertile ground for the particulars of the StarLink crisis
to recur. 229 Biopharming corn and other crops are emphatically not for human
consumption as food. To date, however, they are indistinguishable from those
intended for human consumption, and they are being grown in Iowa and other
parts of the combelt. The Grocery Manufacturers of America have urged
biotech companies to stop using food crops as vehicles for growing biotech
products that humans and animals are not supposed to eat.23° Such calls face
22 Brasher, supra note 220.
227 Justin Gillis, EPA Fines Biotechsfor Corn Violations, WASH. POST, Dec. 13, 2002, at E3.
228 Id. On a related note, FDA is investigating whether genetically modified pigs were
improperly sold into the human food supply. Aaron Zitner, Pigs in Genetic Study May Have
Ended Up as Food, L.A. TIMEs, Feb. 6, 2003, at 17. This incident underscores the very real
possibilities that any GM products might wind up in the human food supply. The likely
effects of a failure to segregate must be considered at the approval stage.
229 Of course EPA has no regulatory authority over biopharming because the crops do not
incorporate pesticides. So EPA's vow does nothing to protect the public from a StarLink-like
fiasco involving a biopharmed crop.
230 Press Release, Grocery Manufacturers of America, GMA Urges the Use of Non-Food
Crops for Biotech Drugs (Nov. 14, 2002), at http://www.gmabrands.comlnews/docs/
NewsRelease.cfm?DocID=1029&.
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stiff political opposition from combelt officials. Indeed, in the wake of the
ProdiGene incident, a biotech industry trade group, BIO, issued and then
revoked a commitment not to grow biopharm corn in the cornbelt.23
If there is one clear lesson from this StarLink corn incident, it is that
under the current system co-mingling of these crops, either by design or
inadvertence, is inevitable. A crisis is waiting to happen. In the meantime,
public fear and distrust of the new technology continues to grow. The failures
are real and so is the public concern. The only way to assuage the public's
concern is for the regulatory agencies involved to take a hard look at their
laissez-faire policies and- to develop more stringent oversight procedures.
Only new, more stringent procedures can rebuild public trust and create
confidence in the safety of GM products.
TV. LESSONS LEARNED
It is important to understand what went wrong with StarLink,
Prodigene and the other recent biotech incidents. The central culprit is a
laissez-faire regulatory philosophy. The 1990's echoed with repeated calls for
regulators to adopt a more cooperative stance with the regulated
community.23 2 These so-called "Next Generation" reforms relied heavily on
voluntary compliance by corporations that had internalized a stewardship
ethic. 233 This idea, that EPA could work in partnership with these corporate
stewards to achieve environmental goals without all the acrimony and
conflict generated by heavy-handed regulatory oversight and enforcement, 234
231 See Philip Brasher, Iowa Denied New 'Drug' Corn, DES MOINES REG., Oct. 23, 2002, at
1A; Philip Brasher, Biotech Group Lifts Corn Ban, DES MOINES REG., Dec. 4, 2002, at 1A.232 See, e.g., ASPEN INST., THE ALTERNATE PATH: A CLEANER, CHEAPER WAY TO PROTECT
AND ENHANCE THE ENVIRONMENT (1996); YALE CTR. FOR ENVTL. LAW AND POLICY,
THINKING ECOLOGICALLY: THE NEXT GENERATION OF'ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY (Marian R.
Chertow & Daniel C. Esty eds., Yale Univ. Press 1997); NATL ACAD. OF PUB. ADMIN.,
TRANSFORMING ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION FOR THE 21ST CENTURY (2000).
233 Project XL was EPA's most visible experiment with stewardship and cooperative
regulation. Regulatory Reinvention (XL) Pilot Projects, 60 Fed. Reg. 27,282 (May 23, 1995).
234 See, e.g., David Case, The EPA's Environmental Stewardship Initiative: Attempting to
Revitalize a Floundering Regulatory Reform Agenda, 50 EMORY L. J. 1 (2001); Dennis A.
Rondinelli, A New Generation of Environmental Policy: Government-Business
Collaboration in Environmental Management, 31 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,891
(2001).
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has become a central tenet of the second Bush Administration. Such an
approach to regulation is based. on a fundamental belief that corporate
stewards will rise to the occasion and will voluntarily assume the burdens of
protecting the environment and society.
StarLink provides a chilling example of how badly an oversight
system built solely upon voluntary compliance can fail. All three agencies
relied on manufacturer self-policing as the primary means to enforce
regulatory requirements. Aventis initially expressed confidence that StarLink
corn could not wind up in the human food supply, claiming that its
stewardship program "had the full participation of the corn industry" and that
the company had "every indication it [was] working well., 235 These initial
claims proved to be false-there was no stewardship program, other than
inadequate warning labels, and grain elevator operators were entirely unaware
of the split registration and the need to keep StarLink corn segregated. Many
farmers had never even been informed of the obligation to keep StarLink corn
from the human food supply.23 6 Others reported that seed companies played
down the significance of these restrictions. 237 News accounts similarly
reported that "warnings were accompanied by a wink and a nudge," together
with advice to the effect that the government had not approved StarLink for
human use yet, but that was just "red tape" that would be resolved by harvest
238time.
These failures undermine the basic assumption underlying compliance
schemes based on cooperation and self-policing-a belief that public and
private interests converge in environmental stewardship. This assumption is
problematic under the best of circumstances. Corporations are private
entities, with private goals. These private goals occasionally coincide with
public goals, but more often in the abstract than the concrete. On a very basic
level, we do all agree-cleaner air and water, and safer food are certainly
desirable public goods. When it comes to allocating who should bear the cost
235 Unapproved Corn, supra note 2, at A-2.
236 Matt Crenson, How Starlink Corn Got Loose, PITTSBURGH POST GAZETTE, Dec. 4, 2000,
at A8.
237 According to a representative of the Iowa Attorney General's office, for example, "farmers
who grew StarLink were told by seed dealers not to worry about the restrictions, that EPA
was on the verge of approving StarLink for human consumption. By the time they harvested
their crop there would be no reason to separate StarLink." Id.
238 Lotterman, supra note 158.
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of providing and preserving these public goods and, more critically, to
determining what costs are appropriate, private and public interests rapidly
diverge. It is in the public's interest, and is therefore the regulator's task, to
persuade, coerce or force companies to internalize the costs of maintaining
these public goods. It is no condemnation of private business entities to say
that their interests differ on this point-the duty to maximize profits drives
corporations to resist internalizing these previously externalized costs.
No amount of warm and fuzzy language can obscure this basic
conflict of interests. Certainly there are times when creative and far-sighted
regulators can help align public and private interests. Market-based incentives
can be a powerful tool to achieve that end. In certain contexts, there are
private companies willing or even eager to adopt stewardship measures. We
should certainly strive for a regulatory system flexible enough to recognize
those actors and those situations. But an effective regulatory system cannot
start from the assumption that private actors will achieve public ends in the
absence of direction and oversight from the public sector. Otherwise, fiascos
like StarLink will be the inevitable result.
A. The Framework Cannot Meet the Challenges of Regulating GM
Crops
The test of any regulatory system must be its ability to resolve the
problems it is charged with regulating. Viewed through that lens, the
Framework has been an abysmal failure. StarLink corn proved that the
existing regulatory regime, with its divided regulatory authority, and its
reliance on voluntary compliance, cannot meet the challenges posed by
biotechnology. The failures are numerous, but the critical flaw in the
Framework is the lack of any structural means of oversight and a concomitant
lack of accountability on the part of GM manufacturers. The peculiar creature
that was "split registration" ensured the StarLink crisis only because it existed
in an inadequate regulatory environment. As one food company executive
commented: "This whole system has been self-policing by the seed industry
and obviously it hasn't worked.
239
Neither EPA nor FDA had an oversight program to back up their
laissez-faire regulatory approach towards this biotech crop. The agencies had
239 Eichenwald, supra note 38.
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no systematic monitoring program to ensure that StarLink-a crop that was
not approved for human consumption-was not, in fact, entering the human
food supply. Despite a complete regulatory inability to trace genetically
modified food crops such as StarLink corn through the
growing-processing--consuming cycle, EPA issued a registration that
assumed, and required, careful tracking of the crop. The faith such a
regulatory action demonstrates in a company's good intentions may be
touching, but, absent some enforcement and oversight mechanism, it can
hardly be called reasonable agency action. The growing presence of
biopharming lends urgency to this concern. Without immediate change, there
will be more StarLinks, and future outcomes may not be so benign.
If we had set out to create a regulatory system specifically designed
for GM crops, the existing regulatory system would not have been the end
product. But lawmakers almost never write on a tabula rasa. Rather, laws are
adopted for specific purposes and are then adapted to newly presented
challenges. It was not unreasonable for the Framework to propose using
existing regulation as a starting point for approaching GM crops. To the
extent that existing legal structures could be adapted to address the challenges
posed by biotechnology, it was only logical to rely on them. At some point,
however, adaptation can no longer serve-new circumstances pose a
challenge beyond the capability of existing law to bend and twist. At that
point, either new legal and regulatory structures must be crafted, or the
challenge goes unanswered. We are at such a point.
In the seventeen years since introduction of the Framework, GM
technology has posed issues unforseen and unaddressed in 1986. The central
problem is that the Framework's division of regulatory authority was created
for a world that no longer exists. The Framework assumes that plant and
pesticide are separate things, each of which can be independently regulated
under a separate regulatory regime. In the old, pre-GM crops days (circa
1986), this division of regulatory authority may not have been a handicap to
effective regulation. The mere planting of a crop did not necessarily imply the
use of pesticides; and, when pesticides were used, they were sprayed on the
outside of the plant and were not incorporated into the plant itself. Only
traces of this sprayed-on pesticide would linger in the ultimate food product.
Biotechnology changed all that. Plant, pesticide, and food are now
inextricably linked: plant and pesticide are the same biological entity; food
and pesticide are the same thing as well. But, this new, integrated plant-
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pesticide-food is still being regulated by three separate agencies, with three
separate regulatory missions and three separate regulatory structures. A
company developing a Bt crop theoretically demonstrates to USDA that the
crop would not pose a danger to agriculture; satisfies EPA that the crop is
safe for the environment and does not contain dangerous levels of pesticides;
and shows FDA that the resulting product will be as safe as other foods.24°
Theory does not match reality. To approve StarLink corn for market,
USDA and EPA repeatedly disregarded significant but unresolved logistical
problems.24 ' These sorts of decisions might be expected from USDA-an
agency charged with promoting agriculture. Given that mission, it may well
have been reasonable for the agency to construe uncertainties in the best
possible light. Indeed, it was this very tendency that prompted Congress to
remove pesticide regulation from USDA' s purview in the 1920s.242 The same
cannot be said for EPA or FDA. The primary charge to these agencies is to
protect human and environmental health and safety. Their defaults should
therefore have been protective, not promotional. Had EPA erred on the side
of caution the agency could never have justified creating a system that hinged
entirely on voluntary compliance with inconvenient registration
restrictions-restrictions moreover that were likely to reduce profits for both
growers and the manufacturer but offer them little in the way of concrete
rewards.
Regulations assume that plant and pesticide are separate things, each
of which can be independently regulated under a separate regulatory regime.
240 See ANIMAL & PLANT HEALTH INSPECTION SERV., USDA, UNITED STATES REGULATORY
OVERSIGHT IN BIOTECHNOLOGY, at http://www.aphis.usda.gov/biotech/OECD/usregs.htm
(last visited Apr. 5, 2003).
241 Unlike "pure science," where the proper response to uncertainty is to reserve judgment,
regulators make decisions based on incomplete information. It is common for regulators to
make decisions with significant social and economic costs against a background of
substantial uncertainty about the scope of a hazard, and the possible benefits of risk
reduction. A regulatory decision to reserve judgment is a decision not to regulate that has
real-world consequences. As a result, scientists in regulatory proceedings frequently feel
pressure to produce "answers" even if highly speculative. For an excellent discussion of how
science is used and misused in the regulatory process, see Wendy E. Wagner, The Science
Charade in Toxic Risk Regulation, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1613 (1995).
242 DONNA U. VOGT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., FOOD SAFETY: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR
CHANGES IN THE ORGANIZATION OF FEDERAL FOOD SAFETY RESPONSIBILITIES 1949-1997
(1998).
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In the old, pre-GM crops days (circa 1986), this division of regulatory
authority may not have been a handicap to effective regulation. By combining
plant and pesticide in a single organism, PIPs invalidate the Framework's
underlying regulatory premises. Moreover, because plant and pesticide are
now united as one, neither USDA nor EPA has the requisite expertise to
regulate effectively. The combination of plant and pesticide represented by
PIPs thus challenges the fundamental assumption of the administrative
state-agency expertise. EPA did not know how corn was co-mingled after
harvest. USDA did, but USDA ceded all consideration of environmental and
human health protection to EPA. FDA, the agency with the ability to inspect
the ultimate food product, also viewed the safety question as one for EPA.
USDA's plant-pest inquiry is far too narrow when the plant involved raises
questions of insect resistance and gene flows. FDA makes "substantial
equivalence" determinations without considering the whole food. Similarly
EPA's ignorance of farming practices renders its PIP regimes vulnerable to
the sort of blunders that produced a regulatory regime entirely ill-suited to
actual farming behaviors.
The Framework encourages these agencies to maintain the fiction that
plants, pesticides, and foods can be considered separately. As a result, the
agencies do not bring the full weight of their delegated authority to bear on
any analysis of the safety of these new crops. These problems are artifacts
caused by an undue reliance on existing law to address brand new problems.
Meeting these challenges involves amending existing laws, and may have to
include some new laws. The Framework itself repeatedly cautioned that it
must evolve in accord with actual experience and that existing law might
have to be modified in light of that experience. It is time to take those
cautions seriously. The regulatory system must adapt, that is change, to match
the new challenges embodied in these new technological capabilities.
B. Resorts to Science Cannot Fill this Regulatory Hole
Proponents of GM technology typically argue that evaluating the
safety of these new technologies is largely a scientific matter. Under such
reasoning, the risks of using the technology are simply balanced against the
benefits, and the appropriate degree and kind of regulation will become
apparent. Unfortunately, regulation is almost never an arithmetic process.
Vital scientific information about risks and benefits is often not available, and
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the absence of necessary information does not vitiate the need to make
regulatory decisions.243
GM crops have been granted exemptions from the rigorous testing
and risk management requirements that are the regulatory norm for food
additives and pesticides. Given that backdrop, industry claims that regulation
must be science-based strike an odd note. Appeals to science usually suggest
a reliance on data-and the regulatory exemptions have largely freed industry
from the obligation to develop and provide that data. USDA does not require
site specific or crop specific information before the agency will grant non-
regulated status. FDA leaves the determination of "substantial equivalence,"
and therefore the need for pre-market testing to the manufacturer. These
regulatory decisions have promoted the rapid growth of the agricultural
biotech industry. However, those same decisions now mean that the ag-
biotech industry has no body of solid scientific evidence to back up safety
claims for GM crops. The fact that industry cannot point to such a body of
evidence does not mean that the products are harmful, but the failure to
develop data does engender public scepticism about purportedly "science-
based" safety pronouncements. This scepticism is only further entrenched
when those companies point to the lack of data about harms as a sound
scientific basis for a conclusion that these crops are safe.
Moreover, StarLink corn's elaborate split registration is a clear
example of how accommodation of a regulated entity's reluctance to develop
product safety data can create chaos. The split registration scheme grew out
of Aventis' unwillingness to develop scientific information that EPA deemed
necessary to the registration process. This was not a situation in which the
agency had to act in the absence of necessary scientific information. EPA's
SAP found more study to be necessary before any conclusion about human
allergenicity could be drawn. Aventis proposed a split-registration to avoid
performing the otherwise necessary research on human allergenicity.
Profitability concerns, not technical impossibility or unfeasibility, were the
root of Aventis' objection to performing this research. On a more cynical
note, doing the research might also have created an inconvenient factual
record that the company would have been hard pressed to disavow. The CDC
243 P. Anand, Decision-Making When Science is Ambiguous, 295 SCIENCE 1839 (2002). For
an excellent discussion of the competing pressures on an agency making decisions with less
than perfect information, see Howard Latin, Regulatory Failure, Administrative Incentives,
and the New Clean Air Act, 21 ENvTL. L. 1647 (1991).
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emphasized the difficulty of a retrospective evaluation of the public health
implications of the introduction of StarLink corn to the human food supply,
and emphasized the importance of evaluating the allergic potential of
genetically modified foods before they become available for human
244consumption.
It is true that no other Bt crop registrant had to account for research
expenses incurred to allay allergenicity fears. It is certainly possible that
doing the necessary research might have raised costs too much, thereby
pricing StarLink corn out of the market. But, no other Bt crop incorporated
cry9c. Aventis clearly saw a strategic advantage in the use of this gene, a
benefit that would be of advantagein the marketplace. While Aventis is free
to make that business decision, it must also be bound by the consequences of
that choice-even when the consequences ultimately threaten Aventis' initial
risk-reward calculus for the product as a whole.
EPA had two options. It could have concluded that StarLink corn
could not be marketed unless and until the proper scientific showing of non-
allergenicity had been made-thus telling industry that these costs were
internal ones, to be accounted in the commercial decision to proceed with
development of a crop. Or the agency could have helped the company look
for ways to profit from its product without first answering the unresolved
allergenicity question. The regulatory/statutory scheme directed EPA to
ensure that the new technology did not pose "unreasonable risks to public
heath or environmental safety." The choice should have been clear. Instead,
the agency seems to have felt itself bound by the Framework's charge of
promoting the new technology, or by pressures not to impose significant costs
on a regulated entity. Rather than requiring the manufacturer to perform
further studies, EPA accepted the Aventis' proposal for a split registration,
thereby permitting Aventis to sell StarLink corn without demonstrating its
safety. This decision was based on an assumption that the StarLink corn
could, and would, be segregated from other corn and kept out of the human
food supply. In light of current industry representations about the
impracticability of segregating GM crops from non-GM crops in the context
of GM labeling discussions, this assumption was simply incredible.
244 CDC REPORT, supra note 9, at 10. The great irony, of course is that had Aventis done the
necessary research, StarLink might well have been approved for human consumption at the
outset.
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C. The Laissez-Faire Approach to Regulating These Crops has Failed
Promoters of GM crops have successfully invoked the traditional
criticisms of command-and-control regulation to prevent, or at least to delay,
effective regulatory oversight of GM crops. Relying on the familiar critique
that command-and-control's "top-down" regulatory approach is insensitive
to variations and too often produces an ossified regulatory system that stifles
innovation, 25 GM promoters argue that such regulation would retard the
growth of a vitally important industry. Instead, they argue for a continuation
of the public/private partnership to enforce Bt registration restrictions that has
been held up as an example of so-called "Next Generation" regulation. 24 6
StarLink, ProdiGene, and other recent biotech industry failures to
meet the minimum standard of care necessary to ensure public safety
underscore just how precarious a reliance on voluntary compliance can be.
While it certainly makes sense to harness market forces to achieve public
goods when possible, StarLink and ProdiGene are exactly what we can expect
from an overreliance on self-policing. u 7 Without a clearly defined and
coherent regulatory strategy that includes oversight as a vital component,
registration restrictions are reduced to a farce. Market-based incentives can
only work if the regulatory scheme aligns the financial incentives of
companies with environmental objections.24 8 GM regulations have failed
utterly on this front and have revealed the strategy of relying on voluntary
compliance alone to be incomplete.
45 See, e.g., Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law: The
Democratic Case for Market Incentives, 13 COLUM. J. ENvTL. L. 171 (1988); Bruce A.
Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law, 37 STAN. L. REv. 1333
(1985). But see Wendy E. Wagner, The Triumph of Technology-Based Standards, 2000 U.
ILL. L. REv. 83 (2000) (rejecting this critique); Sidney A. Shapiro & Thomas 0. McGarity,
Not So Paradoxical: The Rationale for Technology-Based Regulation, 1991 DuKE L.J. 729
(1991).
24 Stanley H. Abramson & J. Thomas Carranto, Genetically Engineered Agriculture: Crop
Biotechnology: The Case for Product Stewardship, 20 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 241, 259 (2001).
247 For a defense of command and control regulation, see generally Wagner, supra note 245;
Shapiro & McGarity, supra note 245.
24 For a discussion of the relationship between deterrence and compliance incentives, see
Clifford Rechtschaffen, Deterrence vs. Cooperation and the Evolving Theory of
Environmental Enforcement, 71 S. CAL. L. REv. 1181, 1215 (1998).
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Despite an initial reaction to the crisis that "we have difficulty
imagining how our corn could end up in the human food supply, ' 249 Aventis
later asserted that such an outcome wasinevitable 25" and blamed the problem
on EPA's grant of a split, rather than full, registration. 21 Although it was
Aventis' failure to implement the registration restrictions that surely made the
ultimate "disaster" inevitable from the beginning, the regulatory agencies
must shoulder a large portion of the blame as well. It was EPA that granted
the misguided split-registration in the first place, and USDA and FDA that
failed to conduct thorough, independent analyses before permitting the crops
to be planted and sold. These agencies created a system under which they
were totally unaware of compliance failures. Indeed, one of the most striking
points about the StarLink corn crisis is that, in retrospect, everyone agrees
that it was inevitable that the stuff would end up in the food supply, but
nobody-not Aventis, and not any of the three agencies with partial
regulatory jurisdiction over StarLink corn-took any steps to prevent this
occurrence. With such lax regulatory oversight, the StarLink fiasco may well
have been "inevitable" from the beginning. Rather than the fulfillment of the
self-policing, corporate steward ideal, the registration restrictions were a
complete failure.
There is certainly much to criticize in the United States' approach to
environmental regulation. It can be overly complex, with difficult and
sometimes conflicting mandates. "Next Generation" critics are right to
challenge regulators to reform-to make the regulatory scheme better, fairer
and easier to understand. That said, even the most vigorous advocates of
"Next Generation" regulatory reform would acknowledge that industry can
only be a partner in environmental stewardship if it actually lives up to
commitments made in the collaborative process. Non-adversarial, cooperative
strategies-important as they are to regulatory reform initiatives-cannot, by
249 See Unapproved Corn, supra note 2.
250 PETITION FOR TOLERANCE, supra note 159.
21 See id at 18. "[S]plit registration was based on the assumption that crops produced for
[animal feed and non-food industrial] uses could be completely segregated from the human
food supply. It is now clear that assumption was incorrect. Indeed, EPA recently announced
it would no longer grant split registrations for products of biotechnology." Id. But it was only
that this split registration was granted in a regulatory framework that specifically prevented
tracking of GM crops that made contamination of the food supply inevitable once StarLink
corn was introduced commercially for feed use.
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themselves, ensure that the public interest is protected.To be successful,
"Next Generation" policies must build on, rather than abandon the strengths
of traditional regulation. The focus should be on overcoming the limits of
traditional command and control regulation rather than merely abandoning
regulation altogether.
StarLink's registration entirely abandoned oversight and monitoring,
the primary strengths of traditional regulation, and replaced them with a
vague hope of good behavior. Neither EPA nor FDA had any way to verify
compliance or to discover non-compliance. Despite determining that the
registration conditions were necessary to protect public safety, EPA made no
attempt to create any oversight structure. This regulatory impotence was no
secret to either the agencies or the registrant. StarLink provides a good
indication of what can happen when there is no likelihood that regulatory
violations will be discovered, let alone pursued. The lesson is
clear-regulation cannot be effective without oversight and the possibility of
enforcement.
Market forces can undoubtably be harnessed to achieve environmental
ends. The Clean Air Act's sulphur emissions trading scheme is perhaps the
clearest example of how well market mechanisms can achieve environmental
ends if properly structured. SOx trading was a success because it was situated
within a developed regulatory system-it did not attempt to take the place of
such a system. Within a regulatory system, complete with an oversight system
to monitor compliance and with consequences for non-compliance, it, indeed,
makes sense to enlist market forces to encourage the most efficient means of
compliance.
Unfortunately, Aventis had neither market nor regulatory incentives
to enforce the "no human food use" and "no international commerce"
registration restrictions that were imposed as a condition of registration. With
no promise of a carrot and no threat of a stick, Aventis was left to self-police
its own adherence to conditions that may have ensured a public good, but
were against its own short-term economic interests. StarLink corn
demonstrated that under such circumstances, industry self-policing will likely
be a disastrous failure. Such a situation undermines confidence in regulatory
agencies, and feeds into public fears about government's inability to protect
against the dangers inherent in new technologies. Time and again, new
technologies initially hailed as miraculous have had unanticipated side effects
that range from the harmful to the disastrous: Thalidimide, DDT, radiation,
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Fenphen,... the list goes on. Each failure adds to a growing public distrust
of technology and to suspicion about governmental assurances of safety.
That the StarLink fiasco could happen here in the United States with
our fully developed regulatory scheme, begs the question of what will happen
in developing countries without advanced regulatory systems. Europe and
Japan repeatedly raise this question. To some extent the StarLink crisis
confirmed their worst fears-inadequate regulation in one country can create
a problem that could spread rapidly throughout the world. This concern is
real. For example, the Philippines approved Bt corn hybrid YieldGuard in
December 2002.252 To the dismay of critics, the Philippines announced it will
not seek to implement the refuge strategy required in the United States.253
Instead, the Agriculture Ministry will tell farmers to plant Bt com every other
year, or to rely on non-corn crops as refuge.254 The alternate year strategy is
totally unenforceable in a country like the Philippines where farmers
routinely save seeds for planting, and the alternative refuge strategy was flatly
rejected in the United States as wholly inadequate to preserve insect
susceptibility.25
5
It is clear that improperly managed GM field trials or ill-considered
approvals of GM crops in one country pose dangers for all nations. The
rapidly globalizing world agriculture trade ensures that every importing and
exporting country would be affected by lax controls in one country. The
StarLink crisis gives real world contours to this concern. Despite clear
requirements that the corn be restricted to domestic, non-food uses, StarLink
corn found its way into foods sold throughout the world. In one year, one
firm, with one genetically modified product, managed to contaminate food
for millions of households and affect the price of a commodity grown by
some 300,000 farmers with a value of tens of billions of dollars. If this can
happen in the United States, what will happen in nations with more limited
capacities to assess and manage the risks of GM crops?
252 Gallardo, supra note 215.
253 id.
254 id.
255 For a detailed discussion of the refuge requirement, and an explanation of why measures
like those proposed in the Phillipines are inadequate, see UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS,
Now OR NEVER: SERIOUS NEW PLANS TO SAVE A NATURAL PEST CONTROL (Margaret Mellon
& Jane Rissler eds., 1998).
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V. A NEW REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
The Framework permitted, and even encouraged, the agencies to rely
on self-policing and industry cooperation as the sole means of ensuring
compliance. Aventis, the patent-holder and registrant of StarLink Corn,
committed to a whole series of measures intended to keep StarLink corn out
of the human food supply. But because of the structure of agricultural
commerce in the United States, the burden of implementing those measures
fell not on the registrant, but on independent growers who, as third parties to
the registration, were not directly subject to regulatoryjurisdiction. Moreover,
at the time the registration was approved, there was no regulatory framework
to monitor and enforce these registration restrictions. Rather than a regulatory
scheme of clear standards of care, the existing scheme was tantamount to a
regulatory vacuum. That has to change.
An exclusive focus on voluntary self-policing transfers far too much
power to the regulated entities. Rather than fulfilling their statutory role as
watchdog and guardian of public safety, the agencies are reduced to the role
of cheerleaders, urging good behavior from the sidelines but powerless to
require it. The public interest has been left unprotected. It is time for
Congress to take the matter in hand and to give the agencies clear regulatory
authority to address the unique challenges posed by this new technology. The
agencies need statutory guidance and authorization to consider environmental
and human health concerns in a unified, organized, and transparent fashion.
The StarLink crisis' relatively happy ending should not be viewed as
evidence that the existing regime is adequate. The CDC may have concluded
that there is too little StarLink contamination to pose a human health risk, but
the dangers the crisis revealed about an inadequate regulatory climate remain
significant and unaddressed. StarLink corn was present in the food supply in
such small quantities only because of the vigilance of anti-GM activists. Had
they been less vigilant, much more of the food supply would have been
contaminated with StarLink corn-possibly leading to untold tragedy. A
serious human health crisis was averted despite the Framework, rather than
because of it. The safety of the food supply in this context owes no debt to
successful government regulation.256
256 It would be clearly inappropriate for a regulatory agency to build a regime that relied on
the possibility of a hypervigilent public as the primary means of enforcing health and safety
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After StarLink, it is clear that reliance on self-policing alone cannot
guarantee safe implementation of this new technology. On the other hand,
even the combined resources of USDA, EPA, and FDA would be inadequate
to inspect every field or to interview every grower. Self-policing must be a
major part of the answer. But rather than wholly abdicating enforcement
responsibility to registrants and "the market," the agencies must leverage
their limited resources by building an enforcement regime that creates private
incentives for stewardship and self-policing. An integral element of any such
scheme must be regulatory oversight and clear sanctions for noncompliance.
Because GM crops are patented intellectual property, a rudimentary
self-policing infrastructure already exists. While it would be a mistake to rely
entirely on self-policing, government regulators can certainly build on this
pre-existing structure. Though StarLink corn showed that Growers
Agreements cannot be the sole means of enforcing registration restrictions,
they can be a powerful tool for leveraging private conduct to achieve public
ends. Before these Agreements can serve that function, however, they must
be placed in the proper regulatory context.
In the United States, Monsanto requires farmers to sign a contract
upon the purchase of GM seeds.257 This "Technology Use Agreement" states
Monsanto is not selling the seeds but is instead granting the grower a limited
licence to use the seeds. As a condition of the license, growers are forbidden
to save seeds for replanting, and are prohibited from exchanging or giving
seeds to other farmers.258 Monsanto retains the right to monitor the field of
farmers at anytime within three years from the time of purchase.259 Monsanto
hires full-time investigators to assist in the enforcement of the licenses.26 °
Other GM producers require similar contractual agreements as a condition of
purchasing GM seeds.
Like Aventis' Growers Agreements, these Technology Use
Agreements require that growers implement governmentally-imposed
requirements. Any such scheme is likely to be overwhelmed by a collective action problem
and by transaction costs. Moreover, such a scheme would call into question the underlying
rationale for having administrative agencies.
257 2003 Monsanto Technology/Stewardship Agreement, available at http://www.monsanto.
com/monsanto/us-ag/content/tools-dir/mta2003.pdf (last visited April 15, 2003).
258 id.
259 Gallardo, supra note 251.
26o Monsanto v. Byrd, No. 7:99-CV-154-Fl, 2000 WL 33952260 (E.D.N.C. Dec. 11, 2000).
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registration restrictions, namely, an insect resistance management plan, and
also require that growers channel the crop to appropriate uses (largely
keeping the crops out of international shipments to the European Union
which has not approved many of these crops).26 1 These requirements are all
good ones. But these Agreements alone will not avoid future StarLink
fiascos. There must also be a strong regulatory "floor" underpinning these
otherwise self-policed requirements.
Monsanto has been vigorous in enforcing its intellectual property
rights, inspecting growers' fields, and bringing lawsuits challenging
unapproved uses of its proprietary seeds.262 The lawsuits not only vindicate
Monsanto's rights in particular instances, but also send a powerful message
to the grower community: Someone is watching, and there are consequences
for failing to follow the rules. Were that same message spread about
observing resistance management programs and appropriately channeling
crops, it might go a long way towards solving the problems identified in this
Article. The problem is one of incentives. Monsanto has a clear incentive to
be vigilant in protecting its intellectual property. To date, it has had no
similar incentive to bring that same attention and energy to enforcing the
registration restrictions that are the precondition for commercial use of these
plants. GM registrants are unlikely to face either costs or sanctions if growers
fail to comply with those restrictions. Growers have even less stake in
compliance. Instead, the costs of such non-compliance is externalized onto
society as a whole. Such a scheme will never produce significant, let alone
full compliance.
GM registrants should be required, as a condition of registration, to
contribute funds that can be used to establish an independent auditing
program. The independent auditors will be charged with monitoring grower
compliance with the registration restrictions. Although the auditing program
would be funded by the biotechnology industry, the auditors would not be
employees of the biotech companies, either individually or collectively. The
261 Monsanto, supra note 256.
262 See, e.g., Richard Thompson, Tennessee Grower Awaits Fine in Monsanto Case,
CROPCHOICE NEWS, Jan. 8, 2003, available at http://www.cropchoice.com/leadstry.asp?
/recid=1279. Since 1996, Monsanto has settled more than 100 cases over alleged
appropriation of its intellectual property. In sixty cases, a lawsuit was filed and Monsanto has
not lost any of the handful that actually went to trial. Id. See also Schmeiser v. Monsanto,
[2002] F.C.A. 309, available at http://decisions.fct-cf.gc.ca/fct/2002/2002fca309.html.
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auditing program would exist as an independent entity, with the mandate of
monitoring grower behavior and reporting non-compliance to EPA and the
relevant biotechnology company.
To facilitate the independent auditing process, all GM producers
should be required to provide the auditing program, and EPA, with the
records of GM crops sold, and the names of growers who have signed the
Agreements at the start of the growing season. The auditors will then verify
that the registrants or their licensees are selling only to growers who
contractually agree to the registration restrictions, and will report and
discrepancies to EPA. As incentive to comply with this requirement, any GM
registrant that can demonstrate that it sold its product only to growers who
executed appropriate Grower Agreements could be offered the same sort of
safe harbor available to those who discover and self-report environmental
violations discovered through an environmental audit. The second part of the
auditor's task would be to follow up with the growers via a field inspection
program, preferably at planting time, designed to determine whether the GM
crops were planted in accordance with the refuge requirement and any other
registration restrictions.
Imposing an annual, pre-growing season reporting requirement, and
creating an independent auditing program would enable regulators to capture
the benefits of both traditional regulation and "New Generation" initiatives.
Empowered by information, regulators could create a system of "voluntary
compliance plus"-with the plus being the auditing program that would
enable regulators to verify compliance, and to sanction non-compliance. Such
a system would give the agencies valuable information about where and by
whom the GM crops are grown. Once agencies have information about where
GM crops are grown, on-the-ground physical inspections become possible.
Auditor reports of irregularities could trigger physical on-site agency follow
up inspections, and any appropriate sanctions to both the grower and the GM
registrant.
In addition to these follow-up inspections, agencies would also need
a small-scale random direct inspection program. The prospect that a grower
might be subject to an unannounced agency compliance inspection, and
sanctioned for any non-compliance, would give growers an additional clear
incentive for complying with the registration restrictions. Holding the GM
registrant responsible for violations of the registration restrictions would
provide a similar incentive to industry. An appropriately designed random
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direct inspection program would have the added advantage of statistically
validating the auditing process, thereby giving an additional level, of
confidence that growers were, in fact, complying with registration
restrictions.
Of course, regulators could not possibly conduct rigorous inspections
of every single grower's fields. Such a project would be both prohibitively
expensive and unduly burdensome. The mere possibility of agency
inspections, coupled with the auditing program, will go a long way towards
insuring compliance as long as there are significant penalties for non-
compliance. For such a scheme to work, however, there must be serious
consequences to both the registrant and the growers for failure to comply.
The consequences must be significant enough to force the GM registrants to
bring the same vigor and intensity to promoting compliance with the
environmental registration restrictions that they currently bring to protecting
their intellectual property. Such a regime might well have a chance to succeed
if coupled with an independent audit of grower planting behaviors.
VI. CONCLUSION
If there is one thing that the StarLink crisis made clear, it is that the
time has come to scrap the Framework in favor of a new normative approach
to managing the risks and promises of GM technology. Regulation must be
specially tailored to address the unique challenges posed by these crops. New
regulation and legislation are unavoidable if we are to successfully capture
the benefits of these crops without exposing the food supply to an
unacceptable level of risk. StarLink corn highlighted some spectacular
inadequacies of the Framework and existing regulations. Congress must take
an affirmative role and give the agencies guidance on how to implement their
mandates with regard to these new crops. In particular, Congress should
create a new regulatory Framework to coordinate EPA, USDA, and FDA
activity to carefully monitor registration conditions in the field, and as grains
are brought to market. The successful regulatory regime will recognize the
challenges posed by the new technology and will address them head on. The
public will have confidence in GM crops only if the government formally
approves them as safe after a thorough and transparent review. The biotech
industry itself should be clamoring for that kind of a process.
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